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CHAPTER I
CREATION OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
1That small business was essential to the American 
way of life was an unquestionable tenet of both liberals and 
conservatives in the government prior to and during the 
Second World War. Both political factions also agreed that 
the war needed to be won and that great sacrifices would be 
necessary in order to achieve that victory. Beyond these 
two basic areas of agreement, however, great divergence as 
to the methods to be used for conserving and protecting small 
business while fighting an all-out war for survival soon 
became apparent. Nowhere was this conflict more obvious than 
in the formation of the Special Committee to Study and Survey 
Problems of Small Business Enterprises of the United States 
Senate (hereafter referred to as the Senate Small Business 
Committee) and in the hearings, debates, and legislation 
Which were direct results of itf s investigations.
^Problems of definition will be discussed in Chapter
IV. Eventhough small business could variously be defined as 
those firms employing anywhere from under 20 to 500 workers,
"small business" generally seemed as clear and separate an 
entity as "farmers" or "labor," and for much the same reasons.
2The formation of the Senate Small Business Committee
grew direqtly out of earlier studies conducted by the
2Temporary National Economic Committee, The TNEC had been 
established by Congressional resolution approved June 16,
1938* This resolution had been enacted in response to a 
. message from President Roosevelt which said that "generally 
over the field of industry and finance we must revive and 
strengthen competition if we wish to preserve and make 
workable our traditional system of free private enterprise."
In order to accomplish this goal, the President recommended 
a more vigorous enforcement of anti-trust legislation and a 
detailed study into various problems allowing for the decreased 
competition in America brought about by economic concentration. 
He closed his remarks in a fashion reminescent of an earlier 
t ime:
No man of good faith will misinterpret these 
proposals* They derive from the oldest American 
traditions. Concentration of economic power in the 
few and the resulting unemployment of labor and capi­
tal are inescapable problems for a modern 1 private 
enterprise1 democracy. I do not believe that we 
are so lacking in stability that we will lose faith 
in our own way of living just because we seek to find 
out how to make that way of living work more 
effectively, * , .
2 , , 
Congressional Record, 76 Cong,, 3 sess., 86:11793-4,
13367-13372«
3U.S. Congress, 75 Cong,, 3 sess.> Temporary National 
Economic Committee, Economic Prologue: I. Hearings (Washing­
ton: Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 1.
Once it is realized that business monopoly in 
America paralyzes the system of free enterprise on 
which it is grafted, and is as fatal to those who 
manipulate it as to the people who suffer beneath 
its impositions, action by the Government to eliminate 
these artificial restraints will be welcomed by 
industry throughout the Nation,
For idle factories and idle workers profit no 
man. 4
The Temporary National Economic Committee which was
formed to study the problem of economic concentration was
composed of three members of the United States Senate,
three from the House of Representatives, one representative
each from the Departments of Justice, the Treasury, Labor,
Commerce, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
Federal Trade Commission, For its goals, the committee was
to make a complete study on monopoly and the concentration
of economic power with emphasis on the causes of concentration
and its effects on competition; the effects of existing
price systems and the price policy of industry on levels of
trade; employment, long-term profits, and consumption; and
the effects of existing tax, patent, and other government
c
policies on these areas.
On April 3* 1941* the TNEC completed its research.
In the three years of its existence^ the TNEC published
4
Ibid,, p. 191*
Ibid., p. 192,
hearings amounting to thirty-one volumes With six supple-
6mental volumes and forty-three monographs. These reports
covered almost every Conceivable area of economic Concern,
but it was the findings summarized in Monograph 17. Problems
of Small Business which directly influenced the formation of
. 7
the Senate Small Business Committee.
One of the primary allegations made in Monograph 17
was that the relative financial position Of small business
8
had been weakened since 1929* This hypothesis was made even 
more critical for the well-being of the nation when put into 
the context of what were considered to be the economic 
contributions of small business. These contributions ranged 
from the special services to the consumer that small busi­
nesses were able to provide through ’versatility of product 
and service which, despite standardizing trends, is still 
deeply desired by the American people , ” to the realization 
that small businesses were important customers of large
^U.S* Congress, 76 Cong*, 3 sess*, Temporary 
National Economic Committee, Description of Hearings and 
Monographs (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941),
pp. 1-32.
^Congressional Record. 76 Cong., 3 sess., 86:13367-
13372.
8
U.S* Congress, 76 Cong*, 3 sess*, Temporary 
National Economic Committee, Monograph 17i Problems of 
Small Business (Washingtons Government Printing Office,
1941)* P* 267.
businesses Just as in the production of "bits and pieces," 
large industries were often dependent upon smaller concerns.
Additionally, the impetus that small businesses
/ ■ 5 * 
provided the economy through competition was seen to be
fundamental:
The independent enterpriser has always been 
and continues to be of immense importance in the 
national psychology. The small businessman, together 
with the independent farmer and professional practi­
tioner, has played an important role in fixing those 
standards of personal initiative, independent economic 
venturing, self-responsibility and self-determination 
in business, which are basic to the American way of 
life.^
In Monograph 17. the TNEC made only the most general 
recommendations for aid to small businesses* These sugges­
tions centered around the need for greater availability of
credit for small concerns and for more efficiency in the
11
management of small firms.
While the TNEC was completing its investigation into 
the problems confronting small business, certain liberal 
members of the Senate headed by James E. Murray, Democrat 
of Montana, decided that a continuing study was needed if 
small business problems were to be surmounted. Murray 
initially thought that small business assistance would take
9Ibid.. pp. 256-257.
10Ibid.. p. 257.
1:lIbid.. pp. 278-279.
the same form as government aid to farmers, particularly in
educating small businessmen so that they would be able to
12compete more effectively with larger concerns. That this 
early emphasis on education would be changed to a more basic 
effort to keep small business alive during a wartime economy 
soon became apparent.
Small businessmen themselves were not wholeheartedly 
in favor of government intervention on their behalf. In 
February, 1938, President Roosevelt had called a small busi­
ness conference in an effort to win back political support 
from that segment of the economy. Confusion was the result. 
Their economic position under-cut by the Depression and by 
Roosevelts attempts to deal with it which most often, served 
to strengthen big business at their expense, small business­
men presented a disunited and unorganised front. Astonishingly, 
even in 1938, most small businessmen believed that their 
interests and those of big business were synonymous. In an 
article about the small businessmens conference The Nation 
stated that the Roosevelt administration faced a revolt of 
small business interests. The paradox of this situation, 
the magazine stated, was that if the New Deal represented
12U.S* Senate, 77 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Print #7:
Small Business Problems: Research and Education (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1941)* PP* 11-12.
any one group, it would be the middle class small businessman.
Yet in attempting to alleviate the economic problems of the
Depression, Roosevelt had alienated those who should have
been his staunchest supporters. The Nation suggested that
if Roosevelts political power was to be retained, a small
business revolt had t o .be avoided by strengthening its
position with respect to monopolies. A re-education of small
businessmen was needed to Show them that their interests were
not with big business, but with the economic welfare of the
"common man." "The interests of monopolies lie in maximizing
profits by restricting production and cornering the market,
but small business can only benefit from increased production
13and expanded general purchasing power."
Senator Murray, one of the most loyal of the New 
Dealers, whether at Roosevelt*s suggestion or not, undertook 
this re-education. Roosevelt*s creation of the TNEC had 
already pointed to special problems confronting small bus­
inesses, yet even that Committee generally agreed that more 
needed to be done. The TNEC, by its very nature, had been 
organized to view the economy as a Whole. Murray and other 
New Dealers were interested in winning back the support of 
small businessmen, and this the TNEC had been unable to 
accomplish. In the fall of 1940* therefore, Murray
^ The Nation. 12 February 1938, p. 173*
introduced Senate Resolution 298 which called for the 
formation of a Senate Small Business C o m m i t t e e . ^
Perhaps the strongest opposition to Senate Resolution 
298 came from William H. King, a Democrat from Utah, who 
ironically was one of the three Senators on the Temporary 
National Economic Committee• Indicating that the TNEC had 
already Studied the problem sufficiently, he stated that the 
high failure rate small businesses experienced was due to 
folly, lack of understanding of the business environment, or 
to lack of management capability, none of which he believed 
were within the parameters of government assistance. He 
further felt that aid to small businesses would keep exces­
sive numbers of these concerns in operation beyond an actual
15demand for their services.
Senator Wallace White, a Republican from Maine, also 
objected to the formation of a Senate Small Business Committee 
since he believed that an unfortunate trend was developing in 
which every matter of any concern was immediately elevated 
to committee status. His argument centered around the 
contention that too much studying had already been done, 
both by the TNEC and the Senate Committees on Banking and
14
Congressional Record. 76 Cong., 3 sess., 86:
13367.
15
Ibid.
Currency and Commerce and that their recommendations should
either be acted upon or dropped, not studied further.^
Senator Murray assured White that the new committee
would not backtrack over areas already studied by the TNEC
or other committees. He pointed out that other special
interests had committees looking out for them as in the cases
of agriculture and labor, and he reminded the Senate that
both party platforms in 1936 had called for aid to small 
17businesses. Murray noted that such diverse offices as
the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture
and the TNEC itself had endorsed his resolution. He quoted
Thurman Arnold, a member of the Temporary National Economic
Committee as saying, ,falthough the files of the Department
and of the Temporary National Economic Committee should be
helpful in the work you propose, I do not feel that they
18
contain the comprehensive picture which you desire*1
Senator Barkley of Kentucky, the Senate Majority 
leader, spoke in favor of the resolution, expressing the 
belief that no harm could come of a further study into the 
problems of small business. He reminded the Senate that the 
new committee Would have no power to report legislation and
16 .
Ibid.. p. 13369*
17Ibid.. p. 13370.
Ibid.. p. 13372.
10
would not, therefore, usurp the powers or authority of the
19regular standing committees.
After some further amendments were introduced which
changed the committee size from five to seven members and
authorized an expenditure of $10,000 rather than the
original $15,000 for committee expenses, Murrayfs resolution
20was passed by a voice vote on October 8, 1940.
The items which the committee was to begin analyzing 
had been outlined by Senator Murray during the debate on 
Resolution 298* These included: (1) the necessity for
finding out the reason for the high mortality rate of 
small business) (2) the consideration of ways to provide 
risk capital and loans for small business) (3) the effect 
of the large numbers of reports required by government 
agencies and the need to reduce or simplify this burden)
(4) the seriousness of studies which showed that as a class 
small business had made no profits since 1928, and (5) the 
desireability of education and research to aid small business 
similar to projects the Department of Agriculture had under­
taken to help farmers. At no time was the possibility of
war or of defense preparations and their effect on small
21
business mentioned.
19 20
Ibid.. p. 13371. Ibid.
2lIbid.. p. 13370.
11
The following day, October 9, 1940, Senator Barkley,
the Majority leader, announced the members of the Senate
Small Business Committee* They were: Senators James E.
Murray, Democrat of Montana; James M* Mead, Democrat of
New York; Francis Maloney, Democrat of Connecticut; Allen
J, Ellender, Democrat of Louisiana; Tom Stewart, Democrat
of Tennessee; Robert A. Taft, Republican of Ohio; and
22Arthur Capper, Republican of Kansas* The Committee
remained as constituted until February 4, 1943 when Senate
Resolution 66 allowed five additional members to be appointed.
These new members were Democratic Senators Claude Pepper
of Florida and James G, Scrugham of Nevada and Republicans
George A* Wilson of Iowa; Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska;
23and C * Douglass Buck of Delaware.
These men constituted the Senate Small Business 
Committee. They served with only minor additions and dele­
tions (Brien McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut replaced 
Francis Maloney in February, 1945; Thomas C. Hart, Republican 
of Connecticut, replaced Robert A. Taft in March, 1945; and
Homer E. Capehart, an Indiana Republican, replaced Hart in
24December, 1945) throughout World War II. In addition to
22Xbid.. p. 13415.
23
Congressional Record. 78 Cong., 1 sess., 89:566.
24Ibid.. 79 Cong., 1 sesa., 91:987, 1596, 12230.
12
the Senate members, the Small Business Committee had a staff
of economic advisers, secretaries and clerical help which
totaled between twenty and thirty people. For a time Senator
Murray1s son, Charles A. Murray, served as the executive
secretary for the Committee but he was replaced by Charles
M. Daughters and then Dewey Anderson as the Committee became
2*5more established*
While the initial composition of the Small Business 
Committee was heavily Democratic, no open conflict was to 
be expected since there was generally unanimous agreement 
within Congress that small business was in need of help.
By 19439 with the addition of three Republican members, 
non-partisanship became harder to sustain, especially as it 
was becoming clear that small business would survive the war 
in better shape than ever. The conflict which developed 
between Senator Murray, representing the liberal,New Deal 
members of the Committee, and Senator Wherry, who spoke for 
the conservative Republicans, had broad complications for 
the entire reconversion and post-war period. When the 1946 
election shifted the majority in the Senate from the
25
U.S. Senate, 79 Cong*, 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 47.
Part 1: Senate Small Business Committee - Its Record and 
Outlook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945),
pp. 28*30.
13
Democrats to the Republicans, a significant change in 
Committee membership resulted and the Chairmanship passed 
from Murray who had maintained leadership throughout the
n Z
war years, to Wherry.
This Shift in leadership within the Committee came 
at a time when reconversion from the wartime economy was 
almost complete and corresponded very nearly with the ending 
of wage and price controls by President Truman on November 
9, 1946. Therefore, this analysis of the Senate Small 
Business Committee will use for its boundaries the formation 
of the Committee in October, 1940 and the end of price 
controls in 1946 accompanied by the significant reorganiza­
tion of the Committee which followed the 1946 election.
Oratory aside, what motivated the creation of a 
special Senate committee to study the problems of small 
business? The threat of war and its effects on the economy 
had not been mentioned in the debate over the formation of 
the Committee, yet with the exception of the Federal Reports 
Act of 1941 and the work the Senate Committee on Small Business 
did in support of that legislation, very little was said 
or done about small business until the end of 1941 when war 
had become a reality. In fact, the first official
26
Congressional Record. 80 Cong., 1 sess., 93•644,
713.
14
hearings of the Committee took place December 15, 16, 17,
18, and 19, 1941.27
The plight of small business was only mentioned in
the Senate twice, and then only in passing, after the
formation of the Committee for the remainder Of 1940.^
In 1941 small business problems were only mentioned there
Once in a very general way, and then with defense problems
in mind, prior to the june 26, 1941 submission Of Report 479.
Part 1 . on ’’The Federal Reports Act of 194i*lf^  Again, there
was a three month gap without, any consideration of small
business problems in the Senate until September 5, 1941 when
the need for war production had caused the President to
establish by executive order the Office of Contract Distribution
30
as part of the Office of Production Management*
Perhaps the slow beginnings of the Senate Small 
Business Committee can be explained in the fact that the 
Temporary National Economic Committee was still in operation 
and remained active until April, 1941 * While the TNEC was
27
U.S* Senate, 77 Cong*, 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems Of American Small Business, Part I. 
hearings (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942)*
28Congressional Record index. 76 Cong*, 3 Sess.,
86:547 i
^ Congressional Record* 77 Cong*, 1 sess., 872 1020-1023•
30 . . .
Ibid.* p. 7381$ Congressional Record Index. 77 COhg.,
1 sess*, 87:589*
15
interested in a broader segment of the American economy, 
there remained a significant area of overlapping concern 
that could not be discounted regardless of the arguments
v
advanced during the debate on the formation of the Senate 
committee•
The relatively slow start the Committee experienced 
might perhaps be further explained in one of the comments 
Senator White of Maine made in argument against the estab­
lishment of the Committee when he pointed out that while 
there Were many supporters of the study within government, 
no one attempting to speak for small business had asked to 
be studied* As much as the New Dealers might have wanted to 
develop a constituency among small businessmen, their early
efforts had been thwarted, and small business seemed
31generally uninterested and apathetic. ‘ With the creation 
of the Office of Contract Distribution, small businessmen 
suddenly had something to gain of a substantial sort from 
the Senate committee, and that, obviously, was a share in 
the defense contract business then developing. With a 
specific goal in mind, small business representatives 
suddenly became quite vocal as evidenced by their partici­
pation in the first hearing conducted by the Senate Small
31
Congressional Record. 76 Cong., 3 sess., 86:
13369.
16
Business Committee. Senator Murray summarized the situation 
in his opening remarks to that hearing:
During this war effort there is a fog of fear and 
apprehension spreading over the country that small 
business may be wiped out. We are witnessing a 
greatly accelerated expansion of monopolies and a 
squeezing out of the little concern due to difficulty 
in getting either defense contracts or materials for 
civilian production* as well as increased difficulty 
in competing under the trade practices and procedures 
that have grown up under /thej big business system.
A continuation of this concentration of economic 
power will be certain to result in an undermining 
of the very foundations upon which our system of 
free enterprise was built.
Hundreds of letters coming to our committee 
from business concerns in all parts of the United 
States declare their eagerness to do their share.
They maintain that* given the opportunity* small 
business can play a tremendously important part 
in the present all-out-war-production /sicJ program.
We believe the immediate way to help small business 
is to utilize it to the greatest extent possible in 
the war effort* We believe this is not only necessary 
to keep small business alive* but it is of the very 
essence of importance to our country at this time 
when production may be the determining factor for
victory*^2
If the Senate Small Business Committee had been 
inactive during its first year of existence prior to the 
war* its activities after war was declared certainly 
proved compensatory. In 1942 alone* the Committee conducted 
eleven hearings* published three formal reports* and
32U.S. Senate* 77 Cong.* 1 sess.* Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part I. Dec. 
15-OL9. 1941. Hearings (Washington: Government Printing 
Office* 1942), pp. 2-3.
17
unofficially sponsored three major pieces of legislation.
The hearings comprised 1800 pages of testimony in which the 
Committee not only heard people representing business organi­
zations from all over the nation* but for which the Committee 
also made several major field trips to various remote loca­
tions in order to get first hand information on topics 
affecting small concerns.
The year 1942 was only a beginning* By the end of 
1945* the Senate Small Business Committee had published 
9484 pages of hearings* printed eight reports and five 
committee prints* and had been indirectly responsible for 
several legislative proposals dealing both with wartime 
production and with reconversion to a peacetime economy.
While small businessmen may not have been impressed 
with the Committee during most of 1941* by 1942 this attitude 
had definitely changed as they saw a chance to use the 
Committee to obtain access to other government agencies* 
notably the Office of Production Management* the Office of 
Price Administration* and the various Defense Department 
procurement agencies. Officials from all of these agencies 
were regularly called to testify before the Committee to 
explain their actions and that experience was sometimes 
sufficient to bring about specific changes in policy as 
will be demonstrated later* Thus the existence of the
18
Seriate Small Business Committee provided a sympathetic forum 
for the small businessmen of the nation during a period of 
great economic stress and turmoil and sometimes resulted in 
alleviating specific irritants or unfair practices. Beyond 
this sizeable accomplishment* the Committee also helped 
obtain fuller utilization in war production from smaller 
producers* especially through the auspices of its brainchild* 
the Smaller War Plants Corporation* and it was a leader in 
assessing the need for positive steps to encourage an orderly 
and equitable reconversion.
While the initial motivation for the formation of 
the Senate Small Business Committee might have been somewhat 
nebulous* tied as it was to New Deal attempts at winning 
support from a loose and uncohesive group* the coming of the 
war gave the Committee direction and purpose. If war had 
been only a possibility in 1940 when the Committee was 
formed* by the end of 1941 it was an actuality. The promptness 
with which the Small Business Committee called its first 
hearings after the declaration of war indicates that the 
Senators were aware that now there was the possibility for 
direct action to aid small business* or to at least see that 
it was not unduly injured* during the war years. In the 
past the TNEC and the Small Business Committee had to content 
themselves with economic theories and rhetoric concerning
the plight of small business; with the coming of war and the 
priority systems, price controls, and defense contract 
letting that followed, there were suddenly concrete problems 
to be addressed and corrected. Faced with these specific 
problems, the Senate Small Business Committee began its 
work«
CHAPTER II
THE COMMITTEE ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS OF 
CONVERSION TO A WARTIME ECONOMY
For the First two years of World War II, the Senate 
Small Business Committee dealt with problems confronting 
small business enterprise brought about by the war economy. 
It also managed to see that legislation was passed dealing 
with a simplification of the vast amounts of reports which 
various government agencies required business concerns to 
submit to them.
The hearings conducted by the Committee and the 
legislation which resulted from its investigations covered 
a wide range of topics. Starting with the freeze on auto­
mobile production and distribution in January, 1942, and 
continuing with various other forms of rationing, the 
Committee hearings in the early war years also dealt with 
insuring small business participation in t^e allocation 
of government contracts. Due to the shortages of various 
strategic materials, especially copper and aluminum, the 
Committee found itself engaged in investigations of the 
mining industry as w<ell.
20
21
These hearings were often inconclusive because they 
served primarily as a catharsis for business concerns faced 
with problems which were largely unavoidable within the 
framework of the wartime situation. By allowing small 
business interests to present their views to representatives 
of the government agencies controlling prices, government 
contracts, or rationed materials, the Committee did help to 
eliminate certain specific injustices. Furthermore, the 
opportunity to have sympathetic Senators listen to their 
problems usually led small businessmen to feel more patriotic, 
if not otherwise better, about the many unavoidable sacri­
fices which were expected of them.
The year 1941 began slowly for the Senate Small 
Business Committee* Until the prospect of United States 
participation in the war became a virtual certainty, the 
only action the Committee took was in researching and 
supporting the Federal Reports Bill. This legislation 
sought to coordinate Federal reporting services to eliminate 
duplication and to reduce the cost of those services to the 
government while minimizing the burden to business of fur­
nishing those reports.
Although Senate Resolution 1666, known as the Federal 
Reports Act of 1941 > was submitted to the Senate on June 26, 
1941 by Senator Mead on behalf of the Senate Small Business
22
Committee, the resolution was referred to the Committee on
Education and Labor where it rested for almost a year and a 
1
half* By that time the work of the Senate Small Business
Committee in response to the war effort had given a certain
respectability to its recommendations which had been lacking
2
in 1941 end the bill passed easily*
The primary reason that the Federal Reports Act 
was not considered and passed until late in 1942, however, 
was that with the declaration of war in December, 1941> 
the Senate, and the Small Business Committee as well, found 
themselves facing much more essential priorities which 
required immediate action* Chief among the problems con­
cerning small business were rationing of scarce resources, 
freezing orders, and the equitable granting of defense 
contracts.
The first major crisis which the Senate Small Business 
Committee investigated was precipitated by the automobile 
freeze declared on January 1, 1942 by Donald M. Nelson, 
Director of Priorities, Office of Production Management*
Leon Henderson of the Office of Price Administration, an 
ancillary agency, explained the necessity for the freeze to
1
Congressional Record* 77 Cong*, 1 sess., 87•5531-32.
2
Ibid.* 77 Cong., 2 sess., 88:9079 and 9479.
the Committee on January 9, 1942 during a formal hearing 
cbnducted at the request of the National Automobile Dealers 
Association* Henderson explained to the Committee and to 
the automobile dealers attending the hearing why it had 
become necessary to terminate the manufacture and sale of 
automobiles * Ho indicated that there had been two overriding 
considerations: first, the need to conserve essential mater­
ials which were necessary for defense production; and second, 
the requirement for facilities capable of producing an addi­
tional eight to ten billion dollars worth of military goods* 
When questioned about the suddenness of the freezing notice, 
Henderson defended the apparent haste and reminded everyone 
that if advance notice had been given, a run could have 
resulted making it impossible to conserve the existing 
stock of cars for priority uses.
Once the automobile freeze was announced, the Senate 
Small Business Committee found that the automobile dealers 
were faced with a variety of almost overwhelming problems. 
With new car stocks frozen, the dealers had to rely on used 
car sales and their service departments for all further 
revenues. Additionally, they still had to provide storage
3
U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 3. Con­
ference of Retail Automobile Dealers. Hearings (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 529-530.
24
space for their inventories of new cars until the government
was able to take delivery or until rationed sales resumed.
The requirement for storage of stocks they could not sell for
what was expected to be an extended period of time proved
to be the major irritant for most of the automobile dealers.
Dealers resented the fact that they would have to bear an
estimated dollar-a-day expense for storing and maintaining
4new cars which they would be unable to sell. When the freeze
went into effect, approximately 450,000 new cars were in
5
the hands of the dealers.
L, Clare Cargile, President of the National Auto­
mobile Dealers Association addressed the Senate Small Business 
Committee during its hearings on January 9, 1942* He pro­
posed specific steps to be taken to help alleviate the burden 
which had been placed upon the car dealers by the automobile 
freeze. Speaking almost directly to Leon Henderson of the 
OPA, Cargile suggested:
1) that the government allow delivery of all 
bona fide orders dated prior to January 1, 1942. He 
estimated that this concession would affect roughly 
five percent of the automobiles in question.
2) that if prices Were frozen on new cars, 
rates be devised which would allow for handling 
and freight charges.
4
Ibid.. p. 524*
5
Ibid., p. 519.
3) that if price ceilings were extended to used 
cars, the same formula for handling be applied to 
them,
4) that all automobiles and trucks which were 
produced except those specifically designed for 
military use be handled through dealers regardless 
of their ultimate destination*
5) that all vehicles purchased by the government 
from dealers be purchased at their full list price.
6) that the government pay for the cost of 
financing, insurance, and storage on all vehicles 
carried by the dealers after January 1, 1942 until 
they were liquidated or released.
7) that the government agree to purchase at 
retail delivery prices all vehicles, frozen or 
subject to rationing, that dealers might offer 
after July 1, 1942, and
8) that no restriction be placed on the sales 
of non-standard vehicles such as limousines, con­
vertibles, or specialty trucks.
As a direct result of the Committee hearings, 
Leon Henderson agreed to:
1) permit delivery of cars in completion of 
orders and sales which were made prior to the 
freezing order of January 1.
2) establish a retail price ceiling in connec­
tion with the rationing order which would provide 
a reasonable margin of profit to the auto dealers 
on the sale of cars being rationed* This proposed 
ceiling would equal the factory list price plus 
Federal excise tax plus a transportation allow­
ance plus a handling and delivery charge (to 
equal five percent of the factory list price and 
five percent of the transportation allowance, but 
not to exceed seventy-five dollars)*
Ibid.* pp. 520-521.
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3) increase the retail price ceiling each month, 
starting February 1, at the rate of one percent of the 
factory list price to recompense dealers for the expense 
of storage, insurance, and interest.^
The Senate Small business Committee decided that
these concessions were not adequate, however, and agreed
that legislation to help automobile dealers, or dealers
in any other commodity which might be rationed or frozen
in the future, was necessary* This legislation was to be
in addition to a $100,000,000 fund established by the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation for loans to auto dealers
to enable them to Carry their investment in the 204,000 cars
which were then completing production* It also was in
addition to a Presidential request for Congress to make a
special appropriation of $300,000,000 for temporary relief
8of employees of firms caught in the freeze.
The proposed legislation, Senate Bill 2315, was 
drawn up as a result of the automobile freeze| however, its 
provisions applied not only to the 44,000 automobile dealers 
of the nation but also to any other persons or firms which 
might be affected by similar rationing orders in the future* 
Basically, what the Committee recommended was that the
7
U.S* Senate, 77 Cong*, 2 sess., Special Committee 
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Part 3* (Washingtoni Government Printing Office, 1942), 
pp. 1-4*
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Re construct ion Finance Corporation bo authorized to buy any 
remaining stock in a resellable condition which had been 
subject to rationing orders of any dealer in that commodity.
The RFC would also be empowered to loan those dealers an 
amount equal to the investment they had in the rationed 
article if that was the dealers* preference. Initially the 
Committee proposed that the RFC be directed to purchase the 
remaining stock of any dealer making such a request if that 
stock could not be liquidated within six months. The pur­
chase was to take place thirteen months a f t e r  the date that 
rationing commenced by a payment to the dealer of the retail
price of the article♦ This retail price would include the
dealers’ cost plus a reasonable charge for handling, servicing,
9
storing* and insuring the article* In its final form, 
however, the bill provided that the time period for liquida­
tion be extended to eighteen months, and the Committee pointed 
out that due to several liberalizing orders which the Office 
of Price Administration had made since the initial freeze
went into effect, it was anticipated that residual stocks
. 10 
subject to assumption by the RFC would be minimal.
The Committee anticipated that the proposed legis­
lation would not result in the Reconstruction Finance
Ibid.. p. 3.
^ Congressional Record. 77 Cong.* 2 sess., 88:3696.
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Corporation buying large quantities of rationed stocks.
Liquidation of existing stocks would be worked out by the
dealers and the RFC would serve only as a guarantor for the
prices of those stocks. With the RFC guaranteeing prices,
dealers planning to stay in business would be encouraged to
buy inventories from those dealers trying to liquidate.
Additionally* the Committee anticipated that the RFC should
make a reasonable charge for its services and that the
liquidation of rationed stocks would not impose any financial
11burden on the RFC or any other government agency.
Senate Bill 2315 was passed on April 27* 1942. It
12
was returned signed by the President on May 11, 1942.
While the bill had actually been reported on the floor of 
the Senate by the Banking and Currency Committee, it carried 
the names of all seven members of the Senate Small Business
13Committee and was clearly based upon their recommendations.
The automobile freeze and subsequent rationing 
generated a great deal of interest in the press. The New 
York Times sympathetically reported the proposals made by 
L. Clare Cargile for alleviating the blow to the automobile 
dealers. The Times also followed the work of the Senate
^ Report 479 . Part 3 * p* 4*i
12Congressional Record. 77 Cong., 2 sess., 88:3704
and 4081.
~^Ibid♦. p. 3696.
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Small Business Committee in this area thereby giving it
its first favorable publicity•^  No one attacked the actual
freeze or rationing of automobiles since they were convinced
that this action was necessary as the nation geared for all-
out war production, yet the work of the Committee to insure
that the blow was equalized and not made more damaging than
necessary to the small auto dealers of the nation apparently
did much to increase its prestige among small businessmen*
G.J* Seedman, President of the American Business
Congress, "the most influential small business organization
in America" stated in support of the Murray Committee that
National Automobile Association Dealers figures six months
after the rationing order took effect showed only a seven
percent mortality rate among auto dealers instead of the
15fifty percent rate they had predicted; The swift action 
by the Committee through Senate Bill 2315 had generated 
the first real signs of support from that nebulous business 
community it had been trying so hard to woo.
While the members of the Senate Small Business 
Committee were definitely sympathetic to the problems
~^New York Times* 2, 7* 10* and 11 January 1942.
1
New Republic. 2 October 1942, pp. 467-468. The 
American Business Congress had been called "most influential" 
by the Saturday Evening Post and was quoted by Seedman in 
his letter to the New Republic*
confronting automobile dealers and others caught up in the 
turmoil caused by the shift to a wartime economy, they made 
it abundantly clear to all concerned that they were not out 
to prevent individual business casualties but only intended 
to soften the blow and enable small concerns to assume a 
portion of the war production effort. Even in the hearing 
to investigate the problems facing the automobile dealers, 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts asked Cargile of 
the National Automobile Dealers Association if there was any 
possibility for using the car dealers* repair and machine
16
shop facilities in the execution of defense subcontracts.
With the war becoming more real every day, many 
Senators developed the attitude that just as there must be 
casualties on the battlefield, so there would be inevitable 
casualties in the economic sector as well. The fear that 
men like Murray had was that by making an all-out effort 
to defeat the enemy abroad, the free enterprise system would 
be detroyed at home, A bit of doggerel was read into the 
minutes of the hearing on Retail Automobile Dealers which 
had been printed previously in The Saturday Evening Post.
It read:
16
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Big business has become immense 
Because of contracts for defense5 
And little business, thanks to Hitler,
Is definitely getting littler.
Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri, who like
Lodge had been one of the many concerned legislators
attending the hearing commented:
That is just as true as can be. Big business 
is getting bigger, and little business is going 
out of business. We are all going to have to 
make sacrifices in this situation, and everybody 
has a different situation. But it seems to me 
your situation and that of the farmers of America 
can be worked out on a gradual basis so as to 
keep you in business and keep the country running. 
Because what is the use of saving the country if 
we don!t have anything left when we do save it? -*-7
The relative success that the Committee achieved in 
the adoption of its proposals concerning automobile dealers 
proved to be short-lived when the Committee moved on to 
the problems faced by independent tire‘ dealers. Hearings 
conducted in March, 1942 resulted in a legislative proposal 
(Senate Bill 2560) which was tabled as soon as it was sub­
mitted and then was not re-introduced for the remainder of 
18
the year. In 1943 another attempt to revive the bill was 
tried but it too failed to gain more than token support 
since the constitutionality of the proposal Was very much 
in doubt from the beginning. Still, certain recommendations
^ Ibid . , p. 565*
18
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made by the Senate Small Business Committee as a result of
its investigations were adopted for implementation by the
presidentially-appointed Baruch Committee which was formed
lo
Specifically to deal with the rubber shortage.
The tire problem was precipitated by the lack of
crude rubber created by enemy takeover of Far Eastern
suppliers and the fact that no suitable substitute for rubber
had yet been commercially developed* As the Committee
studied the resulting tire shortage, it saw a need to encourage
the survival of the approximately 60,000 independent tire
dealers and service stations throughout the country who were
the only ones the Committee found to maintain consistently
a distribution system for the sale of tires and who especially
catered to servicing, repairing, and rebuilding tires*
These latter functions were considered' to be of vital
20
importance to the rubber conservation program.
In addition to the independent tire dealers, the 
SenatecSmall Business Committee found that two other sources 
for tire distribution existed* These were through the
19U.S.. Senate, 78 Cong*, 1 sess*, Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 12*
Part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943),
p. 8*
20U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 479*
Part 4 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942),
P * 5 *
corporate chain stores such as Sears or Montgomery Ward and
through tire and rubber manufacturer-owned stores like
Firestone and the General Tire Company. These dealers were
not hurt by the rationing of tires, the Committee believed,
since chain Stores handled many other items and could absorb
the loss in revenue created by the rationing of tires and
the rubber and tire manufacturers had received a large volume
of government contracts which more than compensated them for
21the loss of tire sales.
Basically, what the Senate Small Business Committee
recommended in Senate Bills 2560 (1942) and 1122 (1943)»
neither of which won the approval of Congress, was that all
distribution of new and rebuilt tires and tubes be handled
through independent tire dealers. This special treatment
they believed to be Justified since other tire dealers did
their major business in different items while the independent
22tire dealers depended upon tire sales for their subsistence. 
For purposes of the legislation, independent tire dealers 
were defined as any persons engaged in the sales and ser­
vicing of tires whose primary business consisted of one or 
more of the following: selling or servicing (but not
manufacturing) tires, automobile or automotive equipment,
 —  '
21Ibid., p. 2.
22T, . .Ibid.
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selling motor vehicle fuels and lubricants, or repairing,
23recapping, or retreading tires*
One of the biggest, changes in policy which resulted
from the Committee hearings on tires was the adoption by
the Baruch Rubber Committee of the proposal that the recapping
Of an old tire not necessitate the use of a tire rationing
card.^  The fact that it was the independent tire dealers
who did the vast majority of recapping meant that in some
ways the tire shortage had actually worked to their 
25
advantage.
The tire situation was a complex one, even more 
involved than that of the automobile dealers. Once the 
President set up an independent rubber committee with a 
Rubber Administrator appointed to supervise the shortage, 
the Senate Small Business Committee seemed quite relieved 
to turn their attention to other, more general, and seemingly 
less complicated topics. While their investigations did 
enable them to make important suggestions which were later 
carried out, in part at least, by the Rubber Administrator,
23
Ibid , « p. 7.
^U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 19* Tire 
Dealer and Rebuilder Problems: II. Hearings (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1943), P* 2537.
Ibid.. pp. 2636-2637.
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the Committee had neither the time, interest, nor background 
knowledge to delve more deeply into an area of such uncer­
tainty. The dubious legality of their proposed rubber 
legislation further indicated that it was intended more to 
appease the tire dealers than to actually change government 
policy to allow preferential treatment in the distribution 
of tires.
While other items were also in short supply or rationed, 
the Senate Small Business Committee did not again consider 
legislation to deal with particular situations. The Committee 
did, however, proceed with its hearings into specific matters, 
and through these hearings, in which small business repre­
sentatives were brought face-to-face with officials from 
the OPA, certain accommodations were sometimes reached.
Hearings were held in April, 1943 on the rationing problems 
confronting the baking industry and in June the Committee 
considered the problems facing the poultry and livestock 
distributors and dealers which were occuring because of 
rationing orders in those commodities. Although the 
Committee served primarily as a source of sympathy for the 
livestock and poultry dealers, the independent bakers were
36
able bo reach an accommodation with the OPA which allowed
26
their production of bread actually to increase.
At the same time it was investigating ways to aid
dealers in rationed commodities, the Senate Small Business
Committee was also putting together a comprehensive proposal
aimed at insuring small business participation in war
production* On March 31, 1942, Senator Murray offered
S-2250, variously known as the Murray-Patman Act (after
the Chairmen of the Senate and House Small Business Committees),
27or the Smaller War Plants Act.
In a background report submitted by the Committee on 
February 5 of that year, the fundamental difficulties facing 
small businesses were assessed. The major problem the 
Committee saw was that of procurement and the fact that the 
Office of Production Management (which' became the War 
Production Board), the Army, Navy, and Treasury all preferred 
to deal with large businesses rather than smaller concerns 
which were thought to be less reliable and more inefficient 
in fulfilling defense contracts. Because most of the 
individuals in charge of procurement for these agencies
26
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had always been associated with big business, the Committee
believed the only way to assure fair treatment for small
plants and to utilize fully the productive capabilities of
the nation was to create a board having centralized power
28to directly represent the interests of small business.
The Committee believed there was a very real danger
that under the pressure for an all-out war effort, production
would be administered so as to cause needless and irreparable
damage to small business. The examples of the tire and
automobile freezes were cited in which the decisions of one
administrator had the power to destroy thousands of business
concerns literally overnight. Representation for small
business on policy-making boards as a check against ill-
considered decisions was deemed essential if small business
Was to survive the war intact. The "dollar-a-year,f men
who had come to dominate various government agencies during
the war and who were all representatives of big business
interests had no counterpart among small businessmen. While
small businesses could not support their own Mdollar-a-yearn
men, the Senate Small Business Committee wanted to insure
29
that they at least had a voice within the government.
28
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During its hearings in December, 1941, the Committee 
heard testimony from Stacy May, Chief of the Bureau of 
Research and Statistics of the Office of Production Management* 
His figures indicated that there was a whole level of indus­
trial capacity in the nation that had not been touched for 
military production. Floyd Odium, Director for the
Division of Contract Distribution and himself an example of 
the inroads big business had made into government circles, 
substantiated this finding by stating that at least 20,000 
more manufacturing plants could be brought into the war 
production effort. This would mean that approximately one- 
quarter of all small manufacturers could convert completely 
to the war effort, while another one-fourth could be partly 
adapted.^
Although most people agreed that a vast untapped 
resource of war production was to be found in the small 
businesses of the nation, few were certain about how it could 
best be utilized. And while the doubt remained unresolved, 
more businesses were forced to close their doors due to a 
lack of critical materials and other war-related problems.
30
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Dun and Bradstreet figures for the first year of the defense 
program indicated that bankruptcies of small businesses had
increased dramatically over those of 1939 while the rate for
. 32big business failures during the same period had plummeted*
This evidence was considered to be even more damning 
when compared to the figures presented by Stacy May which 
showed that fifty-six of America’s 184*230 manufacturing 
companies were awarded seventy-five percent of all Army and 
Navy contracts. The remaining twenty-five percent of the 
defense contracts were distributed among about 16,000 prime 
contractors* Thirteen billion dollars had been spent or 
allocated by the government for plant expansion for big 
business but no consideration had been given for the expanion
33
of small business.
Presidential efforts to include small business in 
the war effort had also been thwarted* Roosevelt had organ­
ized the Division of Contract Distribution in the 0PM in an 
attempt to help small business during the war but it too 
proved ineffective just as its predecessors the Defense 
Contract Service and the Office of Small Business Activities 
had also failed. The Committee believed that such attempts 
to aid small business would continue to prove unsuccessful
32
Ibid.. p. 114.
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as long as small business representatives were only a 
powerless part of the Office of Production Management domi­
nated fey big business interests* With the formation of the 
War Production Board and the centralization it brought about 
in the administration of Wartime production* the Committee 
believed progress was being made* Yet* if small business 
was to fee protected* the Committee felt adequate representa­
tion of its interests on the WPB was essential.^
Senate Bill 2250 was introduced in the Senate by the
Small Business Committee in an effort to deal with this lack 
of representation given small business both in wartime 
production* and more importantly* in the decision-making 
which affected that production* Section I gave additional 
authority to the Chairman of the War Production Board and
made it his duty* through an appointed deputy* to mobilize
aggressively the productive capacity of all small business 
concerns and to determine how they could be most effectively 
used to augment war production* Section II gave power to a 
Smaller War Plants Corporation (Section IV) to encourage 
small business through the granting of government contracts* 
Section III provided that the chairman of the WPB would 
gather information about the capacity of small business for
i
War production* This was to be accomplished by making 
^ Ibid* * pp« 9“10*
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inventories of existing goods* directing the attention of 
government officials to the productive capability of small 
plants, and providing for the letting of subcontracts by prime 
contractors. Additionally, he was to encourage through 
government contracts the conversion of small plants to war 
production, and provide through the Smaller War Plants 
Corporation and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation the 
necessary funds for this conversion. Finally, the measure 
provided for the creation of the Smaller War Plants 
Corporation with a capital stock of $100,000,000 (later 
increased to $150,000,000)* This corporation was to be 
staffed by experts in small business management, engineers, 
and others who could make a study of small businesses with 
the idea of bringing them fully into the wartime economy, 
enabling them to get government contracts, and by so doing, 
speeding up the production of war materials. The Smaller 
War Plants Corporation would not itself engage in manufacturing, 
It would merely act as a prime contractor, letting sub­
contracts to smaller concerns. Additionally, it would 
finance the expansion of small businesses to enable them to 
produce war materials mpre effectively.
Senator Murray indicated in introducing the bill 
that at first the idea was to have the RFC finance aid to
35
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small business, but it was finally decided that it would be 
more effective, and quicker, to let the Smaller War Plants 
Corporation handle financing as well. Collection of loans 
made by the SWPC would revert to the RFC, however, since it
A /
already had the machinery set up to handle repayment.
The bill was also designed to benefit those plants 
wishing to convert to essential civilian production, especially 
to aid them in obtaining critical raw materials needed for 
their operations. It did not address the problems confront­
ing the small distributor or retailer, however, as became
37all too clear in the months following implementation.
Senator Murray led off the debate on Senate Bill 
2250 by saying:
1 am sure that the problem of small business in 
the nation is the most serious problem affecting 
the country, because if we permit small business 
to be destroyed, we shall destroy the American way 
of life. Our democratic system was founded upon 
small business enterprise, and if it shall be 
wiped out, and if the whole field of business 
endeavor shall be taken over by the big monopo­
listic concerns of the nation, then we shall have 
a totalitarian system, we shall have communism
or facism.38
3 Ibid.. p. 3226.
37This problem will be discussed more fully later. 
See page 46 for additional information.
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Perhaps the biggest question raised against Senate 
Bill 2250 came from Senator Harry P. Byrd of Virginia, He 
Was concerned about a provision which would allow the Smaller 
War Plants Corporation to 1 purchase or lease such land, to 
• • . • build, or expand such plants.” He felt the problem 
might be that there were already too many small businesses 
and was concerned that under the provisions of the bill even 
more marginally productive enterprises would be built.
Senator Taft answered this objection by pointing out that 
even proposed construction was no more than what the govern­
ment had already done for big business. Why should not smaller
39concerns have the same privilege, he asked.
Another minor debate centered around whether or not 
the SWPC should have financing powers. Several Senators 
believed that this power should remain with the RFC*
Senator Prentiss M. Brown of Michigan (who later became 
Director of the OPA after his defeat in a senatorial campaign) 
pointed out that under the provisions of the proposed bill, 
money would be loaned on the basis of whether business pro­
duction would be advantageous to national defense. This was 
not true of the RFC which based decisions on whether the 
business was reasonably assured of repaying the loan.
1
Senator Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri furthered this line 
39
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of reasoning by pointing out that the bill would remedy
the problem of small business not being able to bid on
contracts because they could not get funding, and not being
able to get financing without being assured of a bid. The
vicious cycle created between the War Department and the
RFC would foe Cured by the Smaller War Plants Corporation,
40
he thought*
After other generalised discussion on the measure, 
Senator Murray proposed an amendment providing for penalties 
for misuse of the provisions of the bill. Senator Brown 
offered an amendment authorizing the War Department and the 
Department of the Navy to participate in or guarantee any 
loans made pursuant to the Act. The Senate adopted the 
amendments and on April 1, 1942 passed the bill without 
dissent.^
The companion House bill provided for the suspension 
of anti-trust laws for the duration of the war in addition 
to the proposals contained in the Senate version* This 
stipulation angered Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin 
who found it ironic that such a rider should appear on a 
measure designed to aid small business* He moved that the 
bill be returned to conference until this discrepancy could
40
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be worked out and on May 27, 1942 the Senate agreed to 
LaFollette1s motion.^
When the conference report was submitted on June 4* 
however, it, still allowed the Chairman of the War Production 
Board almost exclusive authority to suspend anti-trust laws 
with respect to agreements and procedures necessary to the 
war effort. The only modification which came out of confer­
ence was that the Chairman of the WPB would be required to 
consult the Attorney General. He did not, however, have to 
ask his permission for any actions the WPB might undertake.
At the end of the war, the Chairman, at his own discretion, 
would withdraw his orders and allow the anti-trust laws to 
again take effect. With only minimal debate, the Senate
immediately agreed to the conference report and the Smaller
43War Plants Corporation was created.
The Smaller War Plants Corporation under the 
direction of Lou Holland soon encountered difficulties in
44getting organized and in providing aid to small concerns.
In October, an article in Business Week suggested that
42
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Holland had been the organizer of a 32-company pool 
in Kansas City which had been formed to obtain Navy defense 
contracts. He served as first director of SWPC but his 
success in government was not what it had been as a private 
businessman and he was soon replaced. See Business Week.
18 July 1942, p. 7 and 16 October 1943, p. 15*
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perhaps Holland was intimidated by the amount of money he
had at his disposal. The magazine also speculated that:
possibly Holland can’t be criticized for assuming 
that there is no lack of riders for a gravy train, but 
the champions on Capitol Hill are becoming dissatis­
fied With Holland*s deliberate policy. Senator 
Murray, Chairman of the Senate Small Business Committee, 
has.been preoccupied with getting re-elected and 
Murray’s committee regards SWPC as its baby, conse­
quently doesn’t want to spank it too soon. But 
Senators Mead, Bllender, Stewart and others are now 
urging Murray to put SWPC on the carpet.45
Business Week Went on to discuss the serious problems 
facing the nation’s retailers which provisions of the Smaller 
War Plants Act completely ignored. It quoted a Commerce 
Bepartment forecast which predicted a net contraction of 
300,000 retailers by the end of 1943* The Senate Small 
Business Committee had not taken so pessimistic a view, it 
suggested, probably because there was no strong retailers 
lobby in Washington to Convince them otherwise. Instead, 
the Committee seemed to feel that by tightening their belts 
along with continued pressure on OPA to puncture ceiling 
prices and the WPB to route greater quantities of materials 
into civilian channels, the wholesalers and retailers of the 
nation could survive the War, if not unscathed, at least 
virtually intact. The article closed by saying that ’’this 
disinterested, if not cool attitude in Congress to the
45
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plight of retailers is expected to change very quickly when
46the casualties begin to mount.” That the Committee1s 
approach to the problems of retailers did not change markedly 
bespeaks the success that their pressure on the OPA and WPB 
achieved *
In investigating the price ceilings and standardiza­
tion orders issued by the Office of Price Administration in 
1943 9 the Senate Small Business Committee served primarily 
as an arbiter between small retailers and distributors and 
the OPA. Although they may have wanted to play a more 
aggressive role in the protection of small retailers, an 
exchange between Senator Wherry and J.K. Galbraith represent­
ing the OPA during a Committee hearing in May, 1943 indicated 
that choices were extremely limited and that all options had 
both pros and cons, some which might hurt smaller concerns 
even more than others. The discussion concerned criticism 
leveled against the OPA by representatives of small retail 
establishments for its orders standardizing the making of 
rayon hoisery and forthcoming proposals to standardize 
various other commodities. This standardization order 
which Would virtually do away with brand name identifications, 
was to be coupled with price ceilings for the various items.
In an attempt to aid the small retailers in buying articles
46Ibid.
from manufacturers in competition with chain stores who could 
easily absorb all production and thereby completely undercut 
the independents, the OPA had set price ceilings for inde­
pendents higher than for chain stores. What this meant was 
that the small retailer could then offer the manufacturer 
more for his product than could the chain store, and this 
price differential would thereby enable the independents to
j ' *
purchase goods they might hot be able to buy Otherwise.
What the retailers and the Senate Small Business Committee 
Criticized, however, Was that this policy virtually assured 
the fact that a customer would either pay more for his pur­
chases from an independent retailer^ or that the retailer, 
in ah effort to compete with the chain stores^ would have to 
sell the merchandise at a loss.
Dr. Galbraith replied that the Complexities of the 
market system prevented other Options. He explained that 
while the OPA had established ceilings for the purchase 
Of commodities, thehe had been no attempt to set minimum 
prices; HO saw the possibility that this might even work 
to the advantage Of the independent hetailer; If the 
independent retailer were able to Obtain his toefChandise for 
a few Cents over what the chain stores paid, he would still 
be able tO sell those goods Cbhtpeiiiively, especially in smaller 
Communities in Which chain stbfes had not made significant
49
inroads, he argued. The crux of the problem was in obtaining
a balance between the conflicting segments of the economy.
What the OPA had attempted to do as Galbraith explained was:
to take the situation as nearly as possible as 
we find it, making only those changes which are 
necessary in order to keep the order down to a 
reasonably simple form. The more you elaborate 
and the more allowances you make, of course, the 
more complicated the order becomes.47
Galbraith summarized the choices available to the 
OPA in establishing ceiling prices. Since chain stores were 
automatically able to sell products for less than independents 
they could have set prices high enough for independents to 
be happy* This would have served to give the chain stores 
an added margin of profit. If, on the other hand, the OPA 
had set prices which were realistic for chain stores, smaller 
retailers would have been unable to make a profit and would 
have been forced out of business entirely. The third choice 
was to establish two ceilings, even though this put the 
price differential clearly into public view. The OPA, 
however, believed this to be the least of the three evils.
The price freezing that had been used previously clearly 
benefitted those businesses and/or communities which had 
lower prices at the base date while it encouraged dealings in
47U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 22. Price 
Practices of OPA. Hearings (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1943), pp. 3001-3004.
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black market activities. This problem had become acute in 
the meat and poultry markets and by setting new price ceil-
A R
ings the OPA was attempting to correct past mistakes.
The biggest disparity between points of view held 
by the OPA and the Senate Small Business Committee resulted 
from the fact that they had entirely different interests to 
protect* The OPA, as Galbraith pointed out, was set up to 
protect the consumer, while the Small Business Committee, 
although not insensitive to the needs of the consumer, was 
primarily interested in the welfare of small businesses.
The conflict that resulted was not resolved until 1946 when 
President Truman finally dismantled the O P A . 49 That the 
Committee did not become more deeply involved with the 
policies of the OPA during the early war years can partly 
be attributed to the fact that other matters, particularly 
wartime production, took priority. The change that occurred 
during later years can be at least partly attributed to the 
more prominent role Senator Wherry came to play on the 
Committee•
Wherry and Tom Stewart were members of the subcommittee 
on complaints which came to do the majority of work dealing
48
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49The problems encountered when price controls were 
ended only illustrates this disparity as shall be discussed 
more fully in Chapter III.
with price regulation. Other Committee members, and 
especially Senator Murray, were more involved with small 
manufacturers, particularly in the mining industry, and 
later in reconversion and the postwar problems of small 
enterprises* These differences in emphasis were perhaps 
not so surprising when the backgrounds of Wherry and Murray 
are compared* Aside from the obvious party differences, 
both would seem to have much in common coming as they did 
from Nebraska and Montana, both western states with rela­
tively small urban populations. Wherry was a small town 
retailer while the businesses Murray was familiar with as 
a long time resident of Butte, the copper capital of the 
nation, were of an entirely different sort*
The biggest difference between the views of Murray 
and Wherry were, of course, political* Murray was a New 
Dealer and a committed liberal. He was a strong supporter 
of labor in his position as Chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Education and Labor and he was one of the most vocal 
supporters of anti-trust activities after the war. Wherry, 
on the other hand, was conservative and somewhat provincial 
in his outlook* He saw the threat of big government to be 
as bad as that of big business since there was no force to
52
regulate government if it became too s t r o n g . I n  
December, 1945 a series of hearings to investigate the 
impact of price controls and stabilization policies on 
small business were conducted• As will become even more 
apparent in Chapter III, Senators Murray and Wherry had 
entirely different goals in mind when dealing with the 
Office of Price Administration.
The conflict over military production versus essen­
tial civilian production was another area in which the 
Senate Small Business Committee was unable to provide clear 
guidance. Although the Smaller War Plants Corporation was 
authorized to aid concerns dealing in those essential 
civilian commodities, no one was able to provide a good 
definition of what exactly they might be. All were agreed 
that food, clothing, and shelter were examples but what 
about cars for workers to get to factories, or household 
"conveniences" for the increased numbers of working women?
51General Robert W. Johnson, who took over as director of
This information was generalized from H.A*
Dalstrom, nKenneth S. Wherry," (unpublished Ph.D. disser­
tation, Department of History, University of Nebraska,
1965)3 "James E . Murray,M Who Was Who in America. Vol. IV, 
1961-1968 (St. Louis: Marquis, Inc., Von Hoffman Press,
1968), p. 6915 and New York Times. 24 March 1961*
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Johnson was on a leave of absence from Johnson 
and Johnson for the war1s duration. He served as an Army 
Procurement Officer prior to assuming the post as director
SWPC from Lou Holland until the conflict over reconversion 
forced him to resign* summarized the difficulty when he said 
that nwhen women have to stay home to do the family washing 
/rather than go to work in a defense ^-related jobJ f a washing
CO
machine becomes as important as a bomber •,? While this 
might have been an exaggeration* it did illustrate the many 
conflicting priorities that the War Production Board had to 
consider when making decisions* If war needs and civilian 
consumer needs had been the only considerations* the task 
would still have been monumental* but what the Senate Small 
Business Committee was asking* additionally* was that all 
these needs be fulfilled while at the same time helping 
smaller businesses survive and compete. This conflict 
became even more pronounced in 1943-1944 when the Committee 
attempted to make plans for reconversion from the wartime 
economy to a postwar one*
Floyd Odium* in early testimony before the Committee* 
had attempted to push for a division in the economy whereby 
large manufacturers would handle war supplies while small
of SWPC* See U.S. Senate* 77 Cong.* 2 sess.* Special 
Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business*
Part 10* Smaller Concerns in War Production: I * Hearings 
(Washington: Government Printing Office* 1942), p. 1132.
5business Week. 16 October 1943, p. 15.
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businesses would supply essential civilian needs. This 
suggestion had been discarded in the formulation of the 
Smaller War Plants Corporation plan* yet in a statement 
before the Committee on October 15* 1942* Lt. General Brehon 
B, Somervell* Commander, Supply Services* War Department* 
indicated that even so this idea was still very much alive 
among procurement officers. He summarized the policy of the 
War Department which* although it called for spreading the 
production load over the broadest possible base* nevertheless 
specified that simpler items were to be placed with smaller 
manufacturers to allow more capacity for production in the 
larger plants. It also stipulated that existing production 
lines were not to be slowed down or stopped in order to
54place the work with small plants not then having war work. 
Although the Committee investigations Coupled with the 
activities of the SWPC gradually increased the numbers of 
small concerns engaged in war production so that by December* 
1942 Somervell could boast that sixty-five percent of all 
Army contracts were with small businesses (plants employing
53
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500 people or less according to the general’s definition),^5 
the unresolved question was still who should get which 
scarce materials to produce what commodities?
Senator Murray gave a succinct statement of the 
scarcity problem when he made an opening remark to a hearing 
conducted on January 13 , 1943 on critical, strategic, and 
essential materials. As he said,
It is generally acknowledged that one of the 
biggest obstacles to the fuller utilization of 
smaller plants in war production is the shortage of 
steel, copper, aluminum, and other basic metals 
which constitute the life blood of the war indus­
tries. * . . This Committee looks upon the thousands 
of small mine operators as part and parcel of the 
small business enterprise of the land, which must 
participate to the fullest extent in the war effort. 
Operators of small mines have testified before this 
Committee to the effect that the War Production 
Board has failed to help them expand the production 
of essential materials. At the same time the war 
construction program has brought about an over- 
expansion of plant facilities which cannot be fully 
exploited because of a shortage of strategic metals 
and minerals.56
In a statement before the Committee, Harold L.
IckeS, Secretary of the Interior, called for the utilization 
of low-grade ores even if that meant increasing the price
cc
U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 11.
SmallerConcerns in War Production: II. Hearings (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 1485*
56U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 13« 
Critical. Strategic, and Essential Materials. Hearings 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 1801.
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ceilings on the metals involved so that the added expense
57involved in mining them would be justified. He coupled 
this suggestion with others involving the use of technological 
breakthroughs and with having processing plants co-located
C O
with the mines to decrease transportation costs.
In February, 1943> Murray received increased support
for his interest in critical and strategic materials with
the appointment to the Committee of James G. Scrugham, an ,
ex“engineer from Nevada who had previously been a strong
Supporter of mining interests as a member of the House and
had received warm praise from Ickes for his work t h e r e . ^9
C. Douglass Buck of Delaware was also an engineer and a
60
welcome addition to the Small Business Committee. These 
two men composed the newly-formed subcommittee on the mining 
and minerals industry.
During April and August, 1943> this new subcommittee 
conducted a series of field hearings on critical strategic, 
and essential materials. Although not officially a member of
Ibid,. p. 1821.
18
J Ibid.. pp. 1819-1820.
59Ibid.. o. 1821.
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this subcommittee, Murray continued to be very involved 
with this subject and conducted the August field hearings 
personally. (That the Senator was also seeking re-election 
and that the hearings he conducted took place in Montana 
gives added insight into Murrayfs interest.)
Although these investigations also resulted in 
several pieces of legislation of a technical nature to benefit 
smaller mine owners, the biggest contributions had nothing 
to do with legislation. Instead they served as a catalyst 
between the mining industry and government agencies. As 
Prentiss M. Brown, successor to Leon Henderson of the OPA 
told the committee:
This office has reviewed carefully the digests 
of the field hearings during April before your sub­
committee on mining and minerals industry, which 
you have been kind enough to make available for 
our use• • • • In reviewing the measures taken
since that time under this program, we find that 
at least six of the operators, who indicated to 
your committee a need for higher revenues, have 
already been assigned special copper quotas, 
yielding premiums in addition to the premium of ^  
five cents per pound of copper formally available.
Thus it was that by allowing the smaller concerns of the
nation to voice their views publicly, the Committee was
able to bring about concessions in many areas. Moreover,
61U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 29. 
Critical. Strategic, and Essential Materials: VI. Hearings 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943)* p. 3836.
even when concessions were not forthcoming, the very fact 
that someone in Washington was actually listening to them 
apparently did wonders for the morale of small businessmen, 
John T * Sullivan, a businessman from Helena, Montana summed 
up this attitude at the end of a small business field 
hearing when he said:
1 think we should pass a resolution thanking Mr. 
Daughters /the special consultant to the Senate Small 
Business Committee./ for his cooperation and also 
thanking Senator Murray. I think his taking up the 
cudgel for the small businessmen is one of the finest 
things that has been done. I think the way he is 
following through is very commendable.^
In the rush to take on wartime problems, legislation 
attempting to reduce the mountain of government reports re­
quired of small business almost became lost* Although the 
proposal, known as the Federal Reports Act, was submitted 
before Pearl Harbor, the priority of the war shifted it to 
a secondary position. It was not reconsidered and passed 
until December 11, 1942. Even so, the Act did recognize 
an increasingly burdensome problem faced by small businessmen 
particularly, and in many ways this legislation proved to 
have more lasting results than did other measures dealing 
with more transitory situations brought about by the conflict.
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The measure provided that information needed by the 
government was to be obtained by imposing the minimum burden 
upon business enterprise (particularly small business) and 
at a minimum cost to the government. All unnecessary dup­
lication of effort in obtaining information through reports, 
questionnaires, etc. was to be eliminated as rapidly as 
possible. In order to carry out these objectives, the 
Director of the Bureau of the Budget was empowered to:
1) investigate the needs of various agencies for reports 
from the public and from other government agencies; 2) in­
vestigate the methods used to obtain the information; and 
3) coordinate as soon as possible the reporting services 
of all such agencies to reduce the cost to the government 
and the burden to the public such reports caused. What, 
in effect, the Act did was to force government agencies to 
furnish information to each other when that information 
was not of a confidential nature.^ Ease of reporting for 
business concerns, along with passing references to govern­
ment economy, was considered more important than decentrali­
zation of statistical services into each department of 
government. Decentralization of information-gathering 
functions was still allowed, however, as long as coordination 
existed to prevent unnecessary duplication.
63
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Three years after the passage of the Federal Reports 
Act, the Senate Small Business Committee assessed the progress 
that had been made. It indicated that the problem which had 
existed prior to the war had been intensified during the 
war years. Yet the Committee believed that the Federal 
Reports Act had kept the problem from ballooning. It pointed 
to the fact that complaints concerning government reports 
had decreased considerably since passage of the Act. Specific 
government forms that had been simplified or discontinued 
were cited as Were examples in which the frequency of infor­
mation collection had been decreased. It also pointed to 
certain instances in which small concerns had been completely 
exempted from reports requirements due to a lack of manpower 
or because they did not comprise a substantial part of a 
given industry. Simplification in forms also took place 
and examples were given in which certain OPA forms had been 
cut from twenty-three pages to four pages. Also, concessions 
to the way in which small businesses kept their accounts 
were often made so that the government agencies, in effect, 
asked the right questions rather than requiring the individual 
businesses to do many recomputations•^
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Letters of appreciation which the Committee received 
from organizations such as the American Retail Federation*
U.S. Chamber of Commerce* National Association of Manufacturers* 
and the National Industrial Council indicate that this was 
one of the most popular measures endorsed by the Committee*
This is understandable considering the lack of opposition 
to the measure* even within the government* No one at the 
time seemed concerned with the consolidation of masses of 
information into easily accessible and widely used govern­
ment reports which this law allowed. The coming of computer 
technology probably would have fostered this trend sooner 
or later* but it is interesting to note in the light of 
later fears over the uses for such staggering amounts of 
data in centralized locations that in the 1940’s the only 
concern was for increased efficiency.
In retrospect* the years 1941 through 1943 were 
busy and productive* yet somewhat chaotic for the Senate 
Small Business Committee. Reacting to the demands of a 
now quite vocal interest group* the Committee sought to 
ease the problems of the automobile freeze* the tire 
rationing program* and the need to include small manufac­
turers in wartime production. They also delved into OPA
i
pricing practices* asked important if unanswerable questions 
65Ibid.. pp. 22-23.
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about military production Versus essential civilian needs* 
arid investigated government policies regarding shortages in 
certain critical materials.
Three major pieces of legislation were proposed 
and passed. Senate Bill 2315 provided relief for dealers 
in rationed commodities and resulted from the automobile 
freeze imposed in January* 1942. Senate Bill 2256 established 
the Smaller War Plants Corporation which did a great deal 
to insure that small manufacturers were also able to parti­
cipate in defense contracts. ■ Finally* Senate Resolution 
1666* enacted in December* 1942* attempted to limit the 
amount of paperwork required by the government and thereby 
reduced the burden on businesses that these reports created.
The Committee also served as a catalyst by bringing 
together small business interests and representatives of 
government agencies which so often controlled their fate.
These face-to-face encounters sponsored by a group of 
Senators sympathetic to the needs of small business probably 
did more to help small concerns survive and prosper than 
any amount of legislation could possibly have done. Not 
only did specific changes result from these confrontations 
between businessmen and government officials* but because 
the government officials realized that their decisions
might have to be defended at a Senate Small Business 
Committee hearing* the constraints on their actions which 
this realization fostered had immeasureable* but nonetheless
CHAPTER III
THE COMMITTEE AND RECONVERSION
By the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944* a 
definite change in perspective became apparent within the 
Senate Small Business Committee. With victory becoming 
more certain* the Committee began to explore the questions of 
reconversion and its effects upon the smaller concerns of 
the nation. Contract cancellations, equitable allocation 
of still scarce resources* and disposal of vast amounts of 
government surplus commodities were all topics which had 
to be dealt with as the war wound to an end. The question 
of price controls also continued to be important especially 
as the post-war economy developed and the possibility of 
inflation became more certain. Finally, the role of the 
Committee itself* and its creation* the Smaller War Plants 
Corporation* came into question as it became more and more 
apparent that prosperity* rather than the feared depression* 
was to follow the war. The conflict which prosperity 
inspired over the continued need for government regulation
i
of the economy was apparent within the Committee itself in
64
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th$ opposing views of Senators Murray and Wherry. This 
conflict culminated in the election of 1946 when the 
Republicans won a majority in the Senate, and Wherry 
replaced Murray as Chairman of the Small Business Committee• 
Initial moves toward reconversion began 'in October, 
1943 when Robert W. Johnson resigned as the Director of the 
Smaller War Plants Corporation. He had wanted to shift 
smaller plants to civilian production since he believed 
that the utilization of businesses in the war effort had 
reached a saturation point and that by continuing to gear 
smaller plants for war work, the process of reconversion 
would be made that much more difficult for them. His 
suggestions met with violent opposition from Robert P. 
Patterson, Undersecretary of War, and Lt * Gen. Brehon B. 
Somervell, Chief of the Army Service Forces. They con*- 
vinced Donald M. Nelson of the War Production Board that 
this was a totally irresponsible attitude to have while 
the nation was still very much at war, so Nelson requested 
Johnson’s resignation
Yet this sudden rift was not completely unexpected. 
The Smaller War Plants Corporation had had problems almost 
from its inception. In a series of closed hearings called 
to investigate the effectiveness of the SWPC during the
1
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summer of 1943> 'the Senate Small Business Committee came 
to the conclusion that drastic changes in personnel and 
administrative policy were necessary if the SWPC was to 
function at all as it had been designed to do. Part of 
the difficulty could be clearly traced to the reluctance 
of the War Department to work with the SWPC in developing 
the potential capacity of small business for particular 
procurement needs. However, the Smaller War Plants 
Corporation itself Was also to blame for its failure to 
aggressively aid small concerns, the Committee contended.
The SWPC was Often overly cautious in its financing policies 
/.-.andjifehe//efsfcetcise'"of ;?its;; iaubeontrabti,hg powers had too often 
■ remained unused. ' , • .: '
Under Johnsons administration, some of these 
deficiencies had been corrected and a better working rela­
tionship With government procurement officers was developed
perhaps?because of Johnson* s previous assignment as an
V'..' v  ’ 3
Army procurement officer prior to assuming the SWPC post.
He moved to decentralise the Smaller War Plants Corporation
v  ! ■,' 2  ■ V " '  ■' r .  . : '■ ; "■ v  . :
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by setting up fourteen regional offices to work directly
with the military procurement officers in each area so that
smaller plants in every district could be better utilized.
A record of prime and subcontracts placed with small
business by the Corporation also showed marked improvement
during Johnsonrs administration while the amount of loans to
4
small businessmen increased as well.
Johnson!s biggest problem was that he began to think
and talk about reconversion about a year before anyone else
did. By 1944 the Senate Small Business Committee was even
conducting a series of field hearings to get businessmen's
opinions concerning reconversion and had actively sponsored
legislation to insure that small business interests would
be protected in a post-war economy* but in 1943 Johnson
5
was slightly ahead of his time.
The end of the war was becoming ever more apparent 
and by 1944 the biggest problem facing business, both large 
and small, was created by government cutbacks in defense 
contracts. This difficulty was dramatized in May of that 
year when the Navy cancelled its contract with the Brewster 
Aeronautic Company for the manufacture of Corsair aircraft. 
Although Brewster Aeronautic could not be considered a
^Report 47. Part X . p. 7-11*
5Ibid.
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small enterprise, employing as it did 10,000 persons, it
is interesting to note that in its justification for the
cancellation, the Navy pointed out that the Brewster plant
was the smallest manufacturer of Corsairs and implied that
the cancellation was therefore less Msignificantn than if
it had affected a more major producer. They were also quick
to stress the $180,000,000 this cancellation would save the
Navy while assuring the public that defense requirements
6
would not be impaired.
The initial concern over the Brewster contract
termination involved an interesting twist to the labor
question. The United Auto Workers staged a sit-in at the
plant, not in conflict with management, but in protest over
7the Navy decision. In a New York Times editorial, the 
question of reconversion was not even raised, instead the 
Times argued that labor was being selfish, even unpatriotic, 
since there were still plenty of defense jobs which needed 
doing even if they all did not pay the $1.06 per hour as 
had the Brewster plant• The editorial went on to point out 
that the major effort of the war still lay ahead and even
6
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7
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suggested that the idea of National Service legislation not
be abandoned simply because the end of the war might soon
8
be forthcoming.
The broader aspects of the contract termination
problem as they applied to business enterprises were not
lost on Senator Murray and the other members of the Senate
Small Business Committee, Although the Brewster Company
was located in. Long Island* the Committee anticipated the
biggest impact of contract termination would be felt in the
West since it had been that region which had built up most
9remarkably in support of the war effort. The Committee* 
therefore* decided to hold a series of hearings in the 
Western states to assess the problems there first hand and 
to let concerned individuals in those states know that their 
interests were not being totally ignored in Washington,
8
Ibid.. 31 May 1944. National Service legislation 
had been discussed throughout the war and* if passed* 
would have allowed the government to conscript workers for 
war-related civilian jobs just as was done for military 
service.
9
In 1940* California had only 1,000 people engaged 
in aircraft manufacturing. Between 1941 and 1945 this 
figure jumped to 300*000. The Boeing Company of Seattle 
employed over 40*000 workers during the war while the Denver 
Arms Plant* operated by the Remington Company* and the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal had combined employment figures 
in excess of 35*000. See Gerald D. Nash* The American 
West in the Twentieth Century: A Short History of an Urban 
Oasis (Englewood Cliffs* New Jersey: Prentice Hall* 1973)*
pp. 206-208.
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These hearings were held during July and August,
1944 in Montana, Washington, Oregon, California, and 
Arizona* In an opening statement to the hearings held 
in San Francisco, Senator Murray summarized the problem:
Two months ago the sudden termination of the 
Navy Department * s contract with the Brewster Aero­
nautic Corporation in Pennsylvania and New York 
provided a test-tube example of what will lie 
before the country as we approach the end of the 
war* The Brewster case has aroused widespread 
interest in the problems of reconversion and post­
war readjustment* It has demonstrated the need 
for careful post-war planning if we are to avoid 
the development of chaotic conditions. The Pacific 
Coast has been selected for special study and con­
sideration because it is recognized that this area 
will present a most serious situation when contract 
terminations begin * ^
These hearings resulted in no legislative program 
to aid western small business. In fact, plans to hold 
similar hearings in the south never materialized.
One of the best guarantees for the future of small 
business, Murray believed, was to insure equal representation 
for small concerns on government planning boards* In late 
1944> therefore, he introduced a bill which would have 
created a Small Business Corporation, an independent agency 
with more power and authority than was then possessed by
U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 43. 
Developing the West Through Small Business: IV. Field 
Hearings* San Francisco* July 21 and August 1. 1944 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944)# P. 5327*
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the Smaller War Plants Corporation. He proposed to increase 
the capitalization of this new agency so that it would be
able to handle effectively any difficulties encountered by
• 11 
smaller concerns during the reconversion period. When
this proposal was interred in the Banking and Currency
Committee* Murray's hopes for an independent small business
12agency were indefinitely postponed.
The furor created by this seemingly innocuous bill 
which only attempted to establish for small business an 
agency similar to that already in existence for farmers, 
can hardly be imagined and resulted in the first significant 
division within the.Committee itself* The opposition to 
Murray's bill turned to Senator Wherry for leadership since 
he, as the leading Republican on the Committee seemed most 
likely to support efforts to decontrol the economy* A 
letter to Senator Wherry from DeWitt Emory, President of 
the National Small Business Men's Association, an organi­
zation which had been formed as a result of the Depression's 
impact upon smaller enterprises, summarized the feeling 
of at least Some small businessmen:
11U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 2 sess*, Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 12.
Part 4* Small Business Act of 194-4 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office* 1944)* PP» 2-8s
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Some members of Congress seem to be under the 
impression that the greatest ambition of all, or most, 
small business men is to have the Government do their 
thinking for them, plan the operation of their busi­
nesses, loan them unlimited sums of money, re-design 
* or develop new products for them, and to place a 
field consultant for small business within easy 
reach of every small business man in the country,
1 assure you that at least ninety-five percent of 
the small business men in the United States want 
none of these things, * ♦ . Given a fair break on 
taxes, on labor legislation and administration, 
on the enforcement of the anti-trust laws, the 
small business man can be depended on, not only to 
take care of themselves /sic/ but also to provide 
employment for more returning service men and women 
than all of the big companies in the United States
put together .-*-3
An editorial in the Chic a/go Daily Tribune echoed 
these sentiments, Quoting State Representative Fred A* 
Livkers of LaGrange, President of the Conference of 
American Small Business Organizations, another newly-formed 
small business group, the editorial said that small business 
did not want another tax-spending government bureau. It 
indicated that private banks could easily handle financing 
and went on to suggest that Murrayfs bill would make success­
ful small businesses assume the burden of those businesses 
which should normally be doomed to failure because of their 
inefficiency or lack of able management. Seeing the bill
1-5
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as a continuation of the New Deal, the conservative Tribune 
insisted that it would mean the end of independent small 
business.14
Senator Wherry, in response to the many letters he
received denouncing the Small Business Bill, had second
thoughts about his initial support of the legislation. In
a letter to a constituent who had written to oppose the
measure, Wherry announced that he had withdrawn his name
15from support of Murray!s bill. By dividing the Committee,
he effectively ended the chances for passage of the bill.
When the Small Business Bill failed to receive
Wherry*s continued support and met with disinterest from
members of the Banking and Currency Committee, Murray had
to settle for continuation of the SWPC and the authorization
in Senate Bill 2004 which increased the capitalization of
that Corporation by $200,000,000. The Senate passed this
proposal in June, 1944 but difficulties encountered in the
the House of Representatives delayed it Until December 11,
16
when the President approved the measure.
14Chicago Daily Tribune. 13 July 1944, editorial,
WP.
"* ^Wherry to Charles Ammons, Cushman Motor Works, 
Lincoln, Nebraska, 29 August 1944, WP.
16Congressional Record. 78 Cong., 2 sess., 90:9097*
The increased capitalization provided for the SWPC 
by Senate Bill 2004 had been made necessary by the passage of 
several pieces of reconversion legislation which had been 
enacted during the summer and fall of 1944* These laws 
had wide-ranging impact on the nation's economy, and each 
contained a provision dealing with aid to small business 
during the reconversion and post-war period.
The Contract Settlement Act (Public Law 395) was 
enacted in August, 1944* Senator Murray actually coordinated 
the bill in the Senate through his membership on the three 
committees, including the Small Business Committee, which 
considered the legislation. The philosophy behind the bill 
was that the government should quickly terminate unnecessary 
contracts so that business interests would ”know where they 
stood” in the reconversion period and could plan accordingly. 
It provided the SWPC with the authority to furnish interim 
and other necessary financing as well as expedited compen­
sation for small businesses in connection with their war
18contract termination claims.
The Surplus Property Act (Public Law 457) was passed 
in November, 1944* This act was even more controversial
17Roland Young, Congressional Politics in the 
Second World War (New York: Columbia University Press,
1956), pp. 199-200.
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than the Contract Termination Act since just about everyone 
had a different idea as to how government stockpiles and 
surplus property could best be utilized. As it affected 
small business, however, the Act gave the Smaller War Plants 
Corporation the power to finance by loan or guaranty, the 
purchase of government-owned plants or surplus property by 
smaller concerns. The SWPC was further authorized to make 
purchases itself for later resale to small enterprises. It 
was estimated that there was from $75,000,000,000 to 
$102,000,000,000 in government surplus to be disposed of 
ranging from shirts, to jeeps, to bomber plants. The 
Committee believed that the right disposal policy could 
support an expanding small business economy while the wrong 
policy could conceivably ruin the free enterprise system 
itself by escalating economic concentrations* Not only was 
there equipment to be disposed of, but it was estimated 
that there was $16,500,000,000 worth of government-financed 
war plants which would also be placed on the auction block.
Of these plants, 1,163 were estimated to cost between 
$25,000 and $249,000 while 1,027 cost between $250,000 and 
$1,000,000« The Surplus Property Disposal Act contained 
stipulations against all monopolies or undue concentration.
I
By authorizing the Smaller War Plants Corporation to acquire 
and finance small-lot surpluses for small business, the
76
interests of small enterprises were thereby enhanced. There 
was also a stipulation in the measure which required the 
Attorney General to certify conformity with anti-trust laws 
for all plant disposals worth over one million dollars. In 
a variety of ways, therefore, the Surplus Property Disposal 
Act was decidedly advantageous to the small concerns of 
the nation.^
The War Mobilization and Reconversion Act (Public 
Law 458) proved to be the most controversial of the three 
reconversion measures since it attempted to deal with the 
"human side of reconversion." An omnibus measure dealing 
primarily with the predicted problems of unemployment and 
readjustment to a civilian economy, the Act contained a 
provision which authorized the Smaller War Plants 
Corporation to present claims on behalf of small enterprise. 
to the newly-established Reconversion Director. These 
claims would supposedly enable small plants to be allocated 
a fair percentage of scarce materials. The SWPC would also 
be authorized to regulate the distribution of these resources 
to small businesses.20
~^Ibid. « pp. 15-17 •
20
Ibid., pp. 9-10. The fear of unemployment at 
the conclusion of the war was uppermost in the minds of 
most people. The most popular solution proposed to this 
anticipated problem was to encourage free enterprise. 
Fortunately, these unemployment fears did not materialize
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Although the Congress had expanded the role of the
Smaller War Plants Corporation dramatically through these
reconversion measures* the Corporation was still due to
expire on July 1* 1945. Uncertainty surrounding the life of
the Corporation continued almost up until the last moment.
Senator Murray had hoped for support of his bill to make
the SWPC independent of the War Production Board and to give
it an indefinite life span; however* when action was not
forthcoming* he and the other members of the Senate Small
Business Committee compromised on a simple extension of the
Corporation. Senate Bill 105 was passed April 9* 1945 and
21became law on April 30. The lack of permanence which had 
dominated the operation of the Smaller War Plants Corporation 
and the uncertainty which ensued made it difficult to provide 
continuity in the administration of the Corporation and was 
a primary cause for poor morale among SWPC personnel. These 
factors* combined with the confusion and doubt they engendered 
among small business concerns* were also reasons most members 
of the Small Business Committee had thought it so important
and by 1946 most people were confident that their jobs were 
secure. See George H. Gallup* The Gallup Poll. Public 
0 pin ion 1935-1971. Vo1. 1 (New York: Random House, 1972)* 
pp. 478, 481, 496* and 581,
21
Congressional Record. 79 Cong.* 1 sess.* 91:3186
and 3939*
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22that a permanent peacetime Corporation be established.
Since a consensus on this issue had been lacking, the SWPC
continued to exist from year to year until 1947 when it
23was terminated. Although the majority of the functions 
carried out by the SWPC were continued by the Department 
of Commerce and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
it was not until 1953 when the Small Business Adminis­
tration was finally created that Senator Murray*s goal 
was realized.^ The fact that Senator Wherry took over 
as Chairman of the Senate Small Business Committee in 
1947 is significant in this regard* At least equally 
important, a boom rather than a depression followed the end 
of World War II and small businessmen were too busy return­
ing to a lucrative peacetime market to support actively 
the creation of another government agency of only dubious 
mer it *
The passage of the contract settlement and surplus 
property disposal legislation did a great deal to protect 
the interests of all businesses in the nation. Yet the War 
Production Board continued to control all allocations of 
critical and essential materials and to set priorities on
22
Report 47. Part 1. p. 11.
t
23Congressional Record. 80 Cong., 1 sess», 93;4181*
^ Ibid.. 88 Cong., 1 sess., 99 ! 10^47*
manufacturing as well. This shortage of materials, especially 
steel, created many problems for small plants which had had 
government contracts cancelled and yet were unable to get 
materials so that they could manufacture products for the 
civilian market. In June, 1945* the Committee conducted 
a hearing on the impact of reconversion policies on small 
enterprises in which several small business spokesmen voiced 
their uncertainty and concern for the future. Caught as 
they were between defense cutbacks and the priority system 
which denied them adequate materials for civilian production, 
the future of many concerns did, in fact, look bleak. There 
was general agreement among small business representatives 
at the hearing that special priorities should be established 
for smaller concerns to enable them to proceed with civilian 
production since f,the big boys could take care of themselves.,f
At this same hearing, J.A. Krug, Chairman of the 
War Production Board, defended his use of priorities and 
pointed out that with the coming end of war nsmall business 
people have the greatest opportunity in their lives. They 
have, X am sure, the greatest chance for, success and
25
U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 65.
Impact of Reconversion Policies on Small Business, June 15.
18. and 19. 1945. Hearings (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1945), PP. 7699-7706.
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26
prosperity that small business has ever enjoyed." Krug
went on to announce the lifting of restrictions on aluminum
and when fears about small business being able to get its
fair share of this product were raised, he pointed out that
there would be more than enough aluminum for all conceivable
civilian needs. This had been made possible during the War,
he indicated, when production of this metal had increased
tenfold. "Here is a tremendous resource built up during
the war, waiting there ready for someone to manufacture
27
products from it," he concluded.
The period between the ending of hostilities with 
Germany and the surrender of Japan was a strained one for 
the allocation of critical resources. War production still 
had to proceed since the end of the war with Japan was 
uncertain, yet a return to a civilian economy was to be at 
least partially encouraged* The WPB issued several priority 
regulations during this time, yet the Senate Small Business 
Committee criticized each of them as inadequate. Priorities 
Regulation 27 had been designed specifically as an aid to 
small businesses and allowed qualifying firms to use the 
much sought after AA-4 rating in order to purchase scarce
Ibid.. p. 7716.
Ibid.. pp. 7723-7724.
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commodities for use in civilian manufacturing. Unfortunately, 
certain members of the Committee believed, preferential 
treatment had engendered a "fear psychology" among small 
businessmen since they took this action to mean that the 
government was forecasting difficulties ahead for them.
While the Committee did not call for the discontinuation of 
special treatment for small business in the allocation of 
priorities, it did suggest that continued vigilance was 
necessary if smaller concerns were to survive the transition
4 ^ 28period.
Xn Priorities Regulation 28, the WPB announced a
further aid to small business. Small firms would be allowed
to apply for special priorities to assist them in obtaining
bottlenecked items which were holding up their production
of civilian goods. This preference rating, however, turned
out to apply only to exceptional civilian cases, notably in
the production of washing machines, refrigerators, and
civilian aircraft. Therefore, the Committee argued that
what had been lauded as an aid to small business was
29virtually useless*
28
U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 4-7.
Part 3. Impact of Reconversion Policies on Small Business 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 3-5.
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On June 30, 1945 the WPB issued Priorities Regula­
tion 29 which not only established a new priority rating 
structure for military production, but also provided for the 
eventual elimination of all civilian priority ratings unless 
the WPB felt it was necessary to establish procedures to 
"give priorities assistance for war-supporting or highly 
essential civilian purposes ," The Committee also criticized 
this regulation since there was no guarantee that the size
of a firm would be considered in determining what special
30
assistance should be granted.
What the Senate Small Business Committee recommended 
was that the WPB amend its regulations so that preferential 
ratings would be given to firms doing less than $100,000 in 
business per quarter. This assistance should be granted to 
any smaller firms needing one or two commodities to resume 
civilian manufacture not just to those "exceptional cases" 
referred to in Regulation 28. The Committee further called 
for the strengthening of the War Production Board's use of 
its powers of inventory control since the Committee thought 
a real danger existed for larger firms to indulge in pre­
emptive buying of scarce materials once the war in Europe 
had ended*
30
lb i d .
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Additionally, the Committee suggested that the WPB,
together with the War Manpower Commission, investigate the
possibility of removing all manpower controls over producers
of basic raw materials even in areas where labor was in
31
critical supply. It also wanted the WPB to adopt a definite
policy for setting a proportionate share of basic materials,
particularly steel, aside for the exclusive use of smaller
concerns. This amount should be based on previous use of
such materials by individual small plants, the Committee 
32
asserted. While the provisions contained in the War
Mobilization and Reconversion Act addressed some of these
areas, bottlenecks and delays in receiving shipments continued
33to create problems for civilian manufacturers.
It seemed to most members of the Committee that the 
efforts involved in shifting the ebonomy from war production
31
Although not as stringent as the proposal for 
conscripting workers for defense-related jobs, manpower 
controls took the form of wage ceilings, anti-strike 
provisions, and even the use of military personnel fur­
loughed for work in defense production when civilian labor 
was unavailable or engaged in illegal work stoppages as had 
occurred in the copper mines of Montana during the early 
years of the war. See U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 2 sess., 
Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small 
Business, Part 11. Smaller Concerns in War Production: II. 
Hearings (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943)>
pp. 1537-1538.
32
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^^New York Times. 19 August 19459 IV, p. 7.
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to peacetime manufacturing required almost as much govern­
ment regulation as had been necessary to gear it for war 
initially. Chairman Murray and most of the Senate Small 
Business Committee had no real quarrel with this government 
supervision of the economy. What they Wanted to insure was 
that this control would result in favorable, or at least 
equal, treatment for small concerns. Senator Wherry, 
however, although equally concerned about the well-being of 
small businesses, began to believe the answer lay, not in 
government regulation, but in the removal of economic controls 
over the business sector. During the same hearing on recon­
version policies, Wherry interjected:
The average small businessman is afraid of orders.
He is afraid of directives. He doesn1t know what the 
government is going to do. . . . In the meetings we 
held under the able leadership of the Senator from 
Montana, time and again small business said: rWe
want government off our backs$ we want the right 
to get materials the same as anybody e l s e . * 34
Unlike other differences of opinion, the conflict 
within the Committee over the use of priorities did not 
create any overt problems. It merely reflected the broader 
feelings within the Congress and the nation as to the best 
Ways to deal with the coming post-war situation.
34Hearings, Part 65. pp. 7717-7718. This statement 
is interesting since several small business representatives 
at that same hearing requested more government regulation 
of the economy during the reconversion period rather than 
less; pp. 7713-7770.
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Certainly, the rapid ending of hostilities with Japan 
permitted a smoother transition to a civilian economy*
With the exception of temporary bottlenecks in the distri­
bution of commodities to all who wanted them, small businesses 
generally found more resources available after the war than 
there had been prior to it* This increase in the production 
of raw materials brought about by the war along with the 
technical advancements which had resulted, particularly in 
the use of the newer metals like aluminum and magnesium, 
combined with an almost endless consumer capacity to insure 
the prosperity of the post-war period. Business optimism had 
returned by the end of 1945 * The Hew York Times even went 
so far as to report that small business had suffered no 
reconversion hardships while a Department of Commerce survey 
of 7,000 smaller manufacturers showed ‘that they planned a 
$9,200,000,000 self-financed expansion program during the
next year, a move which had surprised government economists
3 5by its optimism*
The question of price regulation was the second 
area of government control with which the Senate Small 
Business Committee became involved during reconversion.
In a report published by the Committee in March, 1946
^ Hew York Times. 25 October 1945 and 1 August 1945.
86
after a series of hearings into pricing problems as they 
affected small business, the Senate Small Business Committee 
decided that only sufficient production of goods at customary 
levels could remove the inflationary dangers present in 
the economy. Until this level of production could be 
achieved, the Committee thought that continued price con­
trols were necessary. The report pointed to several reasons 
which kept production from reaching this necessary level.
Labor difficulties and shortages, dislocations as industries 
shifted from defense work to civilian production, bottle­
necks and temporary shortages in materials, and transportation 
difficulties, all hindered the full production which they 
believed would guarantee freedom from inflation. The fact 
that the OPA was due to expire in June, 1946 while this full 
production had not yet been achieved, made most of the
Committee members press for an extension of the life Of that 
36
agency.
Although the Committee believed that some form of 
price regulation was necessary until full production could 
be reached, it had received numerous criticisms about the 
actual operation of the Office of Price Administration. The 
Committee continued to serve as a focal point in Congress
36
Report 47, Part 4 . pp. 1-2* Wherry appeared to 
be the Only outspoken critic of the OPA on the Committee.
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for small businesses having problems with government 
agencies which they were unable to settle directly* On 
December 21, 19459 the Senate passed a budget for the oper­
ation of the Committee which recognized this function and 
included a substantial fund for special treatment of the 
reconversion problems of small business. The OPA even set 
up a special liaison officer to work directly with the
Committee to handle problems encountered by small business
37which required Washington action.
The Committee believed that the OPA should constantly 
review,its policies so that they did not discourage produc­
tion as had been done, for example, in the shortening and 
vegetable oil pricing policies. Price increases should be
allowed whenever it was shown that they could stimulate 
38production.
Most members of the Committee considered the 
use of cost absorption to be especially important in 
controlling inflation* This policy attempted to 
balance cost decreases with cost increases in 
determining an industry-wide price. By so doing, the
37
Ibid.* pp. 2-3.
38
lb id.* pp. 3-5. U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 2 sess., 
Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small 
Business, Part 90. OPA Shortening and Vegetable Oil Price 
Policy, Hearings (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1946), pp. 10269-10277.
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policy prohibited price increases when costs had decreased 
through the use of large-volume production techniques 
simply because the pent-up consumer demands for a product 
would support a higher price. A delicate balance had to 
be struck between allowing adequate profit to encourage 
production while keeping a ceiling on prices so that the law 
of supply and demand did not drive them to totally unaccep­
table levels with a concommitant rise in the cost of living
and the push for higher wages which would follow driving
39prices even higher.
The problem of quality control and the OPAfs attempts 
at maximum average pricing (M.A.P.) were also analyzed. What 
the OPA had attempted to do through the use of M.A.P. was 
to insure a wide distribution of goods in all price ranges. 
Certain producers, especially in the clothing industry, 
were required to average out their production of high-cost 
goods with an amount of low-cost goods so that an average 
price of all goods shipped in any given period would not 
exceed the OPA approved price. This regulation had 
created many problems since producers often cut back 
production of less profitable goods so that they could 
concentrate on those which brought in more money. The 
evil of Mtie-in sales1 whereby manufacturers sometimes
39
Report 47. Part 4 . pp. 5-7.
required retailers to buy cheap goods in order to be able 
to purchase more desireable merchandise was also fostered 
through the application of M.A.P., especially in the liquor 
and clothing industries.
The Committee also addressed the difficulties 
involved in the distribution of goods, it criticized the 
OPA for not becoming more involved in this area of the 
economy. Particularly in the distribution of cotton greige 
goods, nylon hosiery, lumber, and scarfs (which were being 
sold to circumvent regulations pertaining to piece goods), 
the Committee deemed it essential that greater coordination 
between the OPA and the Civilian Production Agency be 
forthcoming. Each of these problems was unique; however, 
they all centered around the manufacturer attempting to 
cut the wholesaler out of the distribution picture so that 
a greater profit margin would remain at the production level 
for the manufacturer to pocket. The Senate Small Business 
Committee did not have specific recommendations to offer 
dealing with this problem except to suggest greater “distri­
bution controls.M The Committee concluded its recommendations 
concerning the OPA by stating that price controls should 
interfere as little as possible with normal business pro­
cesses; at no time should they be allowed to force any group
4°Ibid.. pp. 8-13.
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out of business or prevent anyone from entering business 
unless it could be shown to be vital to the maintenance of 
price control itself* This line of reasoning was interesting 
since it indicated the dedication the Committee had to 
the maintenance of price controls* Even though they 
were committed to the protection of established distribu­
tion channels and profit margins* most Committee members* 
with the notable exception of Wherry, felt that price
regulation was even more important to the overall well-
41
being of the economy.
Although the OPA was extended for another year* 
hostility toward that agency was building. Just as in 
the drive against the Small Business Corporation* Senator 
Wherry became the central figure in the battle to end price 
controls. The change in Wherry*s attitude toward price 
controls is almost startling. While he* like Murray and 
the other members of the Committee* had had specific and 
often important complaints about the actual functioning 
of the OPA* Wherry had generally Supported the necessity 
for price ceilings during the war years. In a letter to a 
constituent on July 6* 1945> Wherry summed up this attitude:
There are many things about the OPA of which I do 
not approve. However* it was generally felt by the 
Senate that some control Of prices was better than no
41Ibid.. pp. 14-16.
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control and accordingly even in spite of the 
OPA criticism* [Xj felt it should be extended 
another y e a r . 42
By October* 1945, however* Wherry wrote to Martin
C . Huggett* Executive Secretary for the Chicago Metropolitan
Home Builders1 Association expressing an almost personal
antagonism toward the OPA. He said in part* "It was my
pleasure to vote against and help defeat L-41 /which
attempted to set price limits on building materials/. I
hope it is my further good fortune to help throttle Chester
43Bowles and his many unfair practices in the OPA."
In response to Wherry*s criticisms* Chester Bowles 
wrote the Senator a letter on November 25* 1945 in which he 
indicated that Wherry had misunderstood the purpose of 
establishing dollar and cent ceilings on building materials. 
Wherry had suggested that the OPA was ‘attempting to unfairly 
control profits and not prices per se. Bowles went on to 
explain:
If it was our purpose to control profits 
we certainly have been grossly inefficient, for 
industrial profits have risen 450 percent, 1944 
over av. 1936-39. Department store profits have 
risen over 1000 percent* If my aim was profit 
control* I should be taken to the middle of the 
Potomac River and sunk in thirty feet of water.
4^Wherry to Meta M. Martin* 6 July 1945* WP.
i
C h e r r y  to Martin C. Huggett* 8 October 1945* WP.
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Bowles closed his letter to Wherry by indicating that orderly
decontrol of the economy would best serve the national
interest, including that of small business.^
By the early part of 1946, Wherry had decided to
fight the OPA wholeheartedly. In a letter to another
constituent he wrote!
I might add here that it is my opinion that 
we would be better off without OPA unless its 
present set-up can be made more flexible. . . .
I feel it is the duty of every American citizen 
to do all within their power at this time to 
rid us of bureaucratic control.
This letter is even more interesting since it was in
response to a letter to Wherry stating that price controls
45should be continued.
Wherry, of course, was not alone in his growing 
dislike for the OPA. In January, 1946 an Omaha World-Herald 
editorial stated the case against continued price controls. 
The paper argued that price controls did not, in fact, pro­
tect the consumer, especially in the case of items in great 
demand* By enforcing ceilings on goods, the editorial 
contended, scarcity was only increased since very often 
companies could not induce men to work at wages they could 
afford to pay under their price ceilings. Black market
44Chester Bowles to Wherry, 25 November 1945* WP.
^Wherry to K.O. Broady, 15 March 19465 Broady to 
Wherry, 12 March 1946, WP.
racketeering was rampant since the situation bred "fly-by-
nights with their sleezy goods and questionable business 
46
methods."
An editorial in the Arizona Daily Star echoed this 
theme. Pointing to the experiences after World War I, the 
Star thought temporary inconveniences would be better than 
the attempt at "bottle-feeding the American people under 
the guise of economic security and stability." It pleaded 
that:
With a world crying for reconstruction, with 
millions of homes and their furnishings to be 
manufactured, with millions of automobiles to be 
sold and increasing millions of mouths to be fed, 
let us have enough faith in the principle of free 
initiative to bring an early end to these blighting 
controls. Let us not be frightened by bogeyman tales 
of the 1919-1920 period. Let us have faith that 
what made this country great will continue to make 
it great, and that Americans are not weaklings, 
unwilling to take risks and hardships that go with 
the functioning of the free market of a free 
society. Let us end the controls.47
The New York Times took a slightly more moderate 
view. While it advocated continuation of the OPA for the 
time being, it did call for liberalization of controls, 
especially if it would encourage production* The Times
46
Omaha World-Heraid« editorial. "The Crumbling 
Dike," 17 January 1946, reprinted in Congressional Record. 
79 Cong., 2 sess., 92:A153.
47Arizona Daily Star, editorial, "Let Us End the 
Controls," 28 February 1946, reprinted in Congressional 
Record. 79 Cong., 2 sess., 92:A12l6.
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editorial saw price controls as only a short-term measure
which only indirectly regulated inflation. As such, price
controls should be ended "as promptly and as smoothly as
conditions make possible,” the paper concluded.
Congress did extend the OPA in a greatly weakened
form during the summer of 1946, but when it failed to
stabilize the economy President Truman dispairingly
49terminated the agency on November 6. Prices rose 
immediately after ceilings were removed. Food prices six 
months after the end of price controls were fifty percent 
higher than they had been the previous year while manu­
factured products were up thirty-five percent. Some 
business analysts believed these figures indicated that the 
economy would soon suffer an even greater fall than had 
previously been predicted, but it was not until several years 
later that their warnings would prove at least partially 
true.^
While the Senate Small Business Committee, with 
the exception of Wherry, continued to press for government
48
New York Times, editorial, "Congress and Price 
Controls," 8 April 1946, reprinted in Congressional Record *
79 Cong.5 2 sess., 92:A2020*
49Congressional Record. 80 Cong., 1 sess., 93*A1040.
^^C.F. Hughes, "Merchants Point of View," New York 
Times, 2 March 1947> reprinted in Congressional Record.
80 Cong., 1 sess., 93:2043.
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regulation of the economy with special emphasis on prefer­
ential treatment for small business, it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that J.A. Krug had been right, that 
unlimited potential, even without government assistance, 
existed for small firms. Popular publications began run­
ning "how to" articles for starting various small business
Cl
ventures with emphasis on the returning veteran. Ideas
for publicizing surplus property sales to encourage veterans
to buy materials so that they could go into business for
52themselves were also advanced.
Since the economic outlook, if not positively rosy, 
was at least much brighter than anyone had predicted, the 
Committee began to focus on ways to insure that small 
business received its fair share of any post-war bonanza. 
Although the Committee never succumbed to a totally pollyana 
spirit, always fearing the threat of monopolies and greater
.R. Jenkins, "Before Starting Your Own Business: 
Advice to Returning Servicemen," Readerfs Digest« May, 1945, 
46:89-925 J.D. Woolf, "If I Were Starting a Small Business," 
Reader 1s Digest. July, 1945, 47:98-100; M* Maverick, 
"Opportunities for Veterans: What Small Business Offers and 
How Returned Servicemen Can Get Into It," New York Times 
Magazine. 30 September 1945, P» 12+; these are only examples 
of a favorite topic in the publications of the reconversion 
period *
52
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economic concentration, it was not completely immune to 
the growing feeling that prosperity was near.
In hearings conducted in April, May, and June, 1945* 
the Committee studied the question of how to insure small 
business a place in the expanding world market. Maury 
Maverick, Chairman of the Smaller War Plants Corporation, 
even prepared a bill to enable the SWPC to enter into 
contracts with foreign governments on behalf of small 
enterprises. The Committee proposed a bill similar to 
Maverick*s on May 13, 1946, yet like so many of the Committee^ 
later proposals, it died in the standing committee to which
54it had been referred.
? This effort to insure small business its fair share
of any advantages resulting from the coming of peace was 
also evident in a series of hearings conducted during 
February, March, and April, 1945. Containing over one 
thousand pages of testimony, these hearings attempted to 
assess the future of light metals and to see what could 
be done to insure that small business could benefit from 
the tremendous advances which had been made in that industry
53U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 62.
World Markets for Small Business: II. Hearings (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1945)» p. 7335.
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during the war. Seeing the future production of the 
nation coming to depend on aluminum and magnesium as much 
as it always had on steel, the Committee was concerned that 
the disposal of government-owned plants and stockpiles be 
done equitably. 1 The Way in which we dispose of them, « 
said the Committee,’’will fix the opportunities for the
economical, development and use of light metals in this
' 55
country for many years to come.”
The Committee stressed the fact that in the pro­
duction of aluminum and magnesium, two-thirds of the labor 
took place in the fabrication processes. Additionally, 
all but a few of the fabricators of these metals were 
classified as small businesses just as were most of the 
retailers of these products. Since the Federal government 
had become the biggest producer of aluminum and had backed 
production of most other light metals to the extent that a 
pre-war production of 300,000,000 pounds of aluminum had 
increased to 2,000,000,000 pounds, a valuable resource had 
been developed.56
55U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 4.7.
Future of Light Metals. Hearings (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1945)9 P* 6008.
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Representatives of large companies also testified
at these hearings and it was apparent that the Committee
intended no witch-hunt until the question of the Shipshaw
Contract arose. This contract involved concessions to the
Aluminum Company of Canada, a subsidiary of Alcoa, the
undisputed giant in the aluminum field, by the Office of
Production Management during the war. A complex issue,
fraught with pros and cons, it had also been the subject of
an investigation by the Truman Committee Investigating the
National Defense Program. Senator Truman had stated that
"we are principally interested in getting aluminum; I would
be willing to buy aluminum from anybody. I don*t care
whether it is the Aluminum Company of America or whether
57it is Reynolds or A1 Capone.” This reminder that the 
exigencies of the wartime situation demanded action which 
was not always beneficial to everyone defused the potential 
scandal•
Although the Committee continued to be very active 
with its hearings and investigations, it was otherwise 
almost silent concerning the problems of small business as 
the war came to an end. Legislation was proposed as in the
57U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 59.
The Shipshaw Contract: III. Hearings (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1945)» p* 7101.
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cases of aid to small businesses in foreign markets and to 
provide for a peacetime Small Business Corporation* but when 
these measures received little interest in Congress 
and relative indifference* if not hostility, from small 
businessmen themselves, they were allowed to die. In 
fact* so unsympathetic were some small businessmen to later 
Committee hearings that criticism was even raised that 
witnesses had been purposely selected who represented 
Committee views as opposed to the attitudes of most small 
businessmen•^
The reason that small business had become so dis­
interested in government aid was a valid one. With recon­
version, they had become so busy returning to a fully 
civilian operation (and making money in the process) that 
they had very little to gain from government assistance
Excerpt in Wherry's file from undesignated letter 
from Indianapolis, Indiana dated 22 May 1944, WP. Wherry's 
staff had made a typed copy of the original letter which 
Was not filed and the name of the writer was not included 
on this copy. Wherry seemed to consider it an important 
criticism, however, as he had the excerpt typed and filed 
with his papers on the Senate Small Business Committee. 
While the veracity of such criticism cannot be assessed 
with the resources available* it should be noted that 
several times during the Committee hearings, a point was 
made that business spokesmen or letters from businessmen 
in support of Committee proposals were unsolicited. See 
U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee to Study 
Problems of American Small Business, Part 65. Impact of 
Reconversion Policies on Small Business. Hearings 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), P« 7693*
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and actually stood to lose in some cases by further government 
regulation of the economy* even in the guise of assistance 
to them. Unlike farmers who did not compete directly with 
each other for a piece of the market, small businessmen 
had more to fear from government aid to their competitors 
than they had to gain from that very assistance for them­
selves once prosperity was assured.
Business Week Commented on the background of this 
prosperity when it pointed out that the previous five years, 
rather than working against small business, had actually 
strengthened it. The article pointed to the advantages 
small business had enjoyed during the war through tax 
breaks and the "ravenous civilian market" which large con­
cerns had left almost exclusively to smaller businesses 
when they turned to war production. It also mentioned the 
protection Congress had provided for small concerns which 
had caused the OPA and other government agencies to deal 
with them more gently than they did with their large compe­
titors* Although the article mentioned small business fears 
that by 1947 they might be losing ground competitively when 
compared to big business* it indicated that small business 
was in a much stronger position than it had ever been in 
before the war.59
~*9Business Week. 31 May 1947j P« 15.
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Xn one of the few statements concerning small business 
before the Senate in the early post-war period, Senator 
Murray took a much more pessimistic view. Citing statistics 
prepared by the Smaller War Plants Corporation, he showed 
that big business had grown tremendously during the war.
These figures indicated that this increase had been most 
pronounced among those very large firms - those employing 
10,0()0 or more workers. These giant corporations increased 
their share of total manufacturing employment from thirteen 
percent in 1930 to thirty percent in 1944. Murray also 
pointed to the increase in the number Of mergers, particu­
larly in the fields of iron and machinery, drugs and pharma­
ceuticals, liquors, foods, and textiles. He saw this trend 
toward concentration as frightening and called for a strong 
resumption of anti-trust prosecutions by the Department of 
Justice in order to prevent collectivism and maintain economic 
freedom.^
Murray's belief that business concentration was to 
be feared and that the American way of life was at stake if 
small business was weakened had begun to lose its appeal 
by the end of the war. Small businessmen were still sus­
picious of economic concentration, but a growing fear and
y  —"T— i , ...T . _
60
Congressional Record. 79 Cong., 2 seas,, 92:6886-6887*
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resentment toward government bureaucracy was beginning to 
assert itself even more strongly in the minds of some.
The views of Senator Wherry brought this change into focus. 
While a further study of the economic situation at the end 
of World War IT would undoubtably clarify this issue, the 
fact that a greater number of people in the country were 
now dependent upon larger concerns for their security and 
livelihood perhaps meant that their power to inspire emnity 
had been reduced. Even smaller enterprises had become 
dependent upon the larger businesses in many ways, both 
as customers and suppliers.
The shift in thinking that this represented was 
tied neatly to the return of Republican pre-eminence in 
the Senate in 1946. When Wherry replaced Murray as Chair­
man of the Small Business Committee, a subtle change took 
place in the working of that group. While economic concen­
tration was still investigated when specific situations 
warranted, as during the petroleum shortage of 1946-1947, 
the Committee seemed to become less interested in direct 
government intervention to rescue small concerns. Govern­
ment aid had become suspect, and many small business spokes­
men, now that prosperity was virtually assured, tended to 
oppose federal intervention in the economy. Small business 
representatives created little newspaper or magazine
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publicity following the war* While additional research 
beyond the scope of this thesis would be necessary to sub­
stantiate this conclusion, it is probable that most small 
businessmen were too busy enjoying the benefits of post­
war prosperity to be overly concerned about the threat of 
monopolies and viewed government "red-tape1' as more of a 
hinderanee than a help.
CHAPTER IV
STATUS OF SMALL BUSINESS AFTER WORLD WAR II - A BALANCE
SHEET ON THE SENATE SMALL BUSINESS COMMITTEE
In attempting to assess the position of American 
small business following World War II, it is first necessary 
to define small business. The difficulty in forming such 
a definition readily becomes apparent. Does one use employ­
ment figures, sales or production figures, or perhaps even 
percentage of total market calculations?
The confusion which has resulted from a multitude 
of definitions makes a statistical analysis of small 
business and its position before, during, and immediately 
following World War II virtually meaningless. Government 
figures are inconsistent while business figures are unavail­
able. The measurement of the actual impact of various 
government actions upon small business is, therefore, 
subjective, based primarily upon claims made by the Senate 
Small Business Committee as to its success in dealing with 
this problem*
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These claims are suspect, too, for the Committee 
employed matiy possible definitions for small business at 
various times during its investigations. It even went so 
far as to consider Reynolds Aluminum "small" in comparison
to the giant Alcoa even though its characteristics were
I
very different from those of most small concerns.
The Committee was really interested in an expanded 
definition to include as many businesses as possible. 
Therefore, in the proposed Small Business Act of 1944, 
small business was considered to be:
Any enterprise for profit which, if engaged 
primarily in production or manufacturing, shall 
have employed 500 persons or less for the calendar
year next proceeding. . . or
If primarily a wholesale establishment, whose 
net sales shall aggregate not more than a million
dollars for such calendar yeart or
If primarily in retail, amusement, service, 
or construction establishment, whose net sales 
or receipts for such calendar year shall 
aggregate not more than $250,000.
Provided that /the business/ shall not include 
any business concern which /is/ a dominating unit 
in its trade or industry or otherwise under the 
management or control of such a dominating unit.
1
U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee - 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Part 48. 
Future of Light Metals. Hearings (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1945), pp. 6133-6134•
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In making such determination . ♦ . the comparative 
size of establishments in the particular trade or 
industry /shall be considered/.^
Under this definition, all but 0.12 percent of the 
business concerns in the country would have been categorized 
as 1 small •" The Senate Small Business Committee would have 
allowed all but the 3,600 companies who were indisputably 
giants to be considered small by this classification.
Of course, numerically, small business was vastly 
superior to big business. Even by limiting the definition 
of small business to include those firms employing less 
than 250 workers, half the number of the Committee definition, 
ninety-five percent of all enterprises within the nation 
would be considered "Small.H However, when the percentages 
of employees are considered it is significant that this 
ninety-five percent of the nation's businesses employed less 
than fifty percent of all non-agricultural Workers. Although 
there might have been more small businesses than large ones, 
their influence on the economy was steadily declining.
In its hearings and in the legislative proposals 
which resulted, the Senate Small Business Committee attempted
2U.S. Senate, 78 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 12.
Part 4. Small Business Act of 1Q44 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1944)> p. 2.
3
A.D.H. Kaplan, Small Business. It« Place and 
Problems (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), pp. 21-22.
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to lump all of these enterprises into one category to 
which similar remedies could be applied. The basic impossi­
bility of this attempt finally became apparent to the Committee 
as they considered the conflict of interest between, for 
example, the small tire dealer and the small rubber manu­
facturer or the small grocery store owner and the small
4livestock producer*
Although the Committee continued to encourage the 
idea that small business was a cohesive special interest 
group like farmers or labor, the reality of the Situation 
soon forced them to deal in specifics rather than generali­
ties. This has been discussed previously, especially in 
the hearings on price controls, rationing, and reconversion 
needs. With the exception of the Federal Reports Act, very 
little proposed by the Committee could be considered of 
benefit to the entire small business community. Even the 
establishment of the Smaller War Plants Corporation pertained 
almost exclusively to small manufacturers and did little if 
anything to benefit small distributors or retailers who 
actually composed the bulk of the small business population 
and who suffered the most as a result of war (See Appendix I).
4U.S. Senate, 77 Cong., 2 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 479.
Part 2, Recommendations on Effective Participation and 
Protection of American Small Business in the War. . . and
After (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 19-23•
How effective, then, was the Senate Small Business 
Committee in helping independent small business survive the 
war? While the answer to this question is obviously highly 
subjective, it should first be made clear that small busi­
ness did actually emerge from the war with a higher absolute
prosperity than ever before although its percentage of the
5
total product had declined.
During the early war years, from 1941 to 1943, one- 
sixth of all businesses closed with smaller concerns bearing 
the greatest burden. This rise in the number of business 
deaths had numerous causes, among them the draft and the 
lure of high paying defense jobs. The Senate Small Business 
Committee had been quick to point out that while the govern­
ment was spending vast sums of money to expand the produc­
tive capacity of the nation, large numbers of unused plants
were being forced to shut their doors due to lack of man-
6
power, materials, defense contracts, or credit*
New business starts were also down for the period 
1941-1943 for most of the same reasons that so many firms 
had closed their doors* New business entries for the first
‘i ~  '
Kaplan, Small Business * p* 51*
6
U«3* Senate, 79 Cong*, 1 sess*, Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 47.
Part 1. Senate Small Business Committee - Its Record and 
Outlook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), PP* 3
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three months of 1943 dropped to an all-time low. Manu­
facturers were the exception to this downward trend• New 
plants were built to fulfill war contracts to the extent
that the number of manufacturing firms showed a net increase
7
of nearly 15,000 between 1939 and 1943.
Those small businesses which continued throughout 
the war suffered setbacks in comparison to large firms. 
Increased concentration became evident as early as 1943 when 
the same small firms which had employed 42.5 percent of the
8
total business work force employed only 31.5 percent by 1943. 
Big business had definitely gotten bigger during the war.
After a bleak two years, business recovery became 
apparent by the end of 1943. By the spring of 1944 new 
businesses were being started twice as fast as businesses 
were discontinuing. A year after the‘end of the war, the 
business population had increased even more markedly and 
more than counteracted the decline which had taken place 
during 1941-‘1943 . (See Appendix I) .
The prosperity which war production had brought 
about was primarily responsible for this upturn, yet certain 
contributions had been made through the Work of the Senate 
Small Business Committee. Even though big business had
7
Kaplan, Small Business, p. 45.
8
Ibid., p. 46.
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r
/ dominated in the receiving of defense contracts, the efforts 
of the Committee and its brainchild, the Smaller War Plants 
Corporation, had placed over $12,000,000,000 in contracts 
with small business. Not only did this provide additional 
funds to smaller concerns, but more significantly, it 
allowed them to go into many new areas of endeavor, particu-
Q
larly in the light metals and plastics fields.
While the future for small manufacturers looked
good at war1s end, the possibilities for small concerns in
the construction industry and in retailing were excellent.
Service industries also had an exceptionally good prospect,
especially since very little in the way of capital investment
was required to begin. Additionally, the advancements made
by business in the South and West during the war had been 
10
substantial.
Even the benefits which had accrued to large 
businesses as a result of the war could be beneficial to 
smaller concerns since the high level of employment and 
prosperity they helped to create expanded the potential 
markets for small business as well. By turning to customized,
9
U.S. Senate, 79 Cong., 1 sess., Special Committee 
to Study Problems of American Small Business, Report 4-7.
Part 1. Senate Small Business Committee - Its Record and 
Outlook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), PP* 9-10.
10
Ibid., pp. 17-20.
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individualized production of everything from apparel to
i
home furnishings, the small concerns could only benefit
from the increased standard of living even if they were
unable to compete directly with their larger counterparts.
Additionally, the new products which big business produced,
front radios to lawnmowers, created the need for new service
facilities and small enterpreneurs readily filled the gap.
Once it becomes clear that small business was not
significantly hurt, and in many ways even helped by the
war and post-war economy, the question of the Senate Small
Business Committee’s influence can again be approached.
Senator Murray and most other members of the Committee had
an acute fear of giant corporations, almost to the point
that they were unable to grant that they served any useful
purpose. Although this fear of big business had apparently
diminished by war’s end, by attempting to sanctify small
enterprise, the Committee did serve as a brake upon the War
Production Board and the military procurement agencies in
their attempt to turn the war over entirely to the large 
11
concerns.
Through its hearings on the rationing orders of 
the CPA, the Committee also allowed smaller concerns to
11
In Report 47, Part 1, the Committee even commented 
that small business and big business could co-exist in 
harmony, p. 4*
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receive some protection from government pronouncements 
which, no matter how necessary they might have seemed, 
still had the power to ruin thousands of independent 
retailers virtually overnight. By opening its hearings 
to representatives of many small concerns and through its 
field hearings conducted in various parts of the country, 
the Committee allowed specific problems to be presented.
Then by calling forward the director of whatever government 
agency was concerned, the Committee was sometimes able to 
strike a compromise satisfactory to both parties. Of course, 
the very fact that government administrators might have to 
justify their decisions before the Committee must have at 
least made them consider more carefully the consequences 
their actions might have upon the small businesses of the 
nation. These benefits are intangible, but while they 
cannot be measured or accurately assessed, they were none­
theless significant to the continued existence and well­
being of small business.
Another intangible benefit which resulted from the 
existence of the Committee was the sense of identity it 
served to give to stnall businessmen. Prior to the formation
V * '
of the Senate Small Business Committee in 1940, hearings by 
the TNEC had first mentioned small business as a separate 
entity. This somewhat novel approach to the problems of the
113
economy was immediately fastened upon by Senator Murray in
his move to establish the special Senate Committee to bolster
12small business support for the Roosevelt Administration.
While there had been very little feeling of kinship 
between the small manufacturer and the small retailer or 
between the owner of the corner gas station and the owner 
of the papermill on the edge of town, in fact they had much 
in common. Problems of financing, taxation, and even of 
filling out government forms and applications were all 
similar as were difficulties they encountered in ordering 
scarce commodities and in dealing with price ceilings and 
rationing edicts brought on by the war economy. Previously, 
small businessmen had felt that they had more in common 
with members of their church, lodge, or even with represen­
tatives of large concerns within their own industry than 
they had with other small businessmen. In fact, prior to 
the formation of the Senate Small Business Committee,
13small businessmen’s associations were almost non-existent.
12
It is interesting to note in this regard that 
"small business" was not even a separate topic in the 
Reader’s Guide to Periodic Literature until after the 
formation of the Senate Small Business Committee, yet 
it has remained a separate listing since then.
13
The Small Business Men’s Association was founded 
in 1937, just prior to the TNEC investigation; the National 
Federation of Independent Business, the largest of the 
small business organizations, was founded in 1943; and the
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By attempting to create a constituency, the Senate 
Small Business Committee helped focus the idea of simi­
larity of interests among at least some small businessmen.^ 
Furthermore, by attempting to treat them as a class, like 
labor or farmers, the Committee almost inadvertantly pointed 
out the complex interlocking characteristics of the economy. 
They thereby forced government planners to revise many of 
their more simplistic attempts at regulating the economy 
and served as a counterbalance to the demands of the other 
interest groups.
Although the Committee was influential in the re­
conversion period through its efforts to insure that small 
businesses received their fair share of government surpluses 
and allocations of scarce commodities, its prestige, while 
never high, was on the wane. The split between Wherry and 
Murray was at least partly responsible for this decline
Conference of American Small Business Organizations was 
founded in 1942. See Encyclopedia of Associations. Edition
9 (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1975). The rise in 
small business awareness growing out of the Depression and 
war years merits further study.
' "I A
Retail stores formed cooperatives to buy govern­
ment surpluses, for example* See New York Times* 20 
September 1944; and Governor Thomas E. Dewey even attempted 
to rally this new interest group during the 1944 election.
See New York Times. 1 November 1944.
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since it can hardly be expected that a special committee 
which did not present a united front would wield much 
influence. An even more cogent reason for the inability . 
of the Committee to inspire much interest was simply that 
small businesses, once the wartime emergency was over, were 
doing so well that they felt they had no need for a protector 
in Washington. When the situation had looked grim during 
the early war years, they had welcomed the intervention of 
the Committee in their behalf and in some cases even demanded 
it. By 1946, small concerns seemed almost universally con­
vinced that they could go it alone. However, the new aware­
ness that the Senate Small Business Committee had helped to
ic
inspire lingered on. It was additionally encouraged 
through the Office of Small Business in the Department of 
Commerce which had been formed to carry on some of the 
functions of the Smaller War Plants Corporation. Thus 
in 1953i when a downturn in the economy occurred, it was 
hot surprising that the small business community once 
again became active and sought government assistance in 
their behalf, culminating in the creation of the Small 
Business Administration.
15Business Week, 31 May 1947.. p# 15 discusses this 
change in small business thinking during the immediate 
postwar period.
16The creation of the Small Business Administration 
was tied to several circumstances, among them the
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Small businessmen would never be as homogeneous a 
group as farmers or labor, but they would continue to see 
themselves as members of a new, distinct group. The counter­
balance that this new status provided politically, likewise 
cannot be measured, yet it did exist. Politicians had to 
consider proposed legislation for its effects on yet another 
interest group, and although small businessmen continued 
to advocate independence, they learned the value of cooper­
ation in establishing organizations to aid themselves not 
only in conducting their businesses, but in lobbying 
activities in Washington.
The Senate Small Business Committee did not act 
alone in dealing with the small business question. In 
addition to a House of Representatives Small Business 
Committee, both the Truman Committee to Investigate the 
National Defense Program and the Select House Committee 
Investigating National Defense Migration (Known as the 
Tolan Committee) were active in attempting to aid small 
businesses. A look into the activities of these committees
discontinuation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
This topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, but illustrates 
the fact that small business awareness did not completely 
die during the period of prosperity following the war. See 
Deane Carson, ed., The Vital Majority. Small Business in 
the American Economy (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1973)9 pp. 9-12.
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would surely cast additional light upon the status of 
small business during World War II.
The resumption of anti-trust prosecutions after the 
war helped to insure that unlawful concentrations would 
not be encouraged at the expense of smaller competitors.
In the case of United States vs. New York Great Atlantic 
and Pacific Tea Company (A & P), the U.S. Court of Appeals 
decided that even though the chain store was efficient and 
could sell its products for less than smaller businesses, 
its restraint upon the competition placed it in violation 
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Court had decided that 
the lower prices charged the consumer by A & P did not 
Justify the harm which could result to the community if 
independent grocers were forced to close their doors.
The danger of the growth of chain stores was 
that they tended, as in the A & P case, to become their 
own producers and distributors as well as retailers. If 
they were also the supplier to their competition, as in 
the A & P case, and on less favorable terms than to their 
own outlets, the small competitor could easily be denied 
the opportunity to compete freely on the merit of his own 
product and service. While the Court specifically stated 
that bigness was no crime as long as it did not destroy
fair competition, the decision helped to insure that larger
concerns could not blacklist smaller ones or give preferen-
17tial treatment to their own subsidiaries.
Although the resumption of anti-trust investigations 
allayed some of Senator Murray’s worst fears, no attempts 
at trust-busting were staged at the end of the war. Big 
business had become a way of life in the United States and 
it continued to employ even greater numbers of workers and 
exert its influence upon the nation in countless ways (See 
Appendix IX). Before the Depression, the existence of big 
business was also pervasive within the economy; the differ­
ence was that then it had been considered the exception; 
everything that was not "big business1 was simply "business.” 
Somehow, either during the Depression or as the nation 
geared up for war production, a subtle shift in thinking 
occurred. Suddenly big business became not so much the 
exception as the norm and "small business" came into 
existence. From 1940 onward, there were "business" and 
"small business" differentiations. Smaller concerns, while 
still numerically superior, were now the distinct minority 
in numbers of individuals employed, and their proportionate 
share of the market had also declined. Governmental emphasis
17U.S. vs. New York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company. 67F. Supp. 626 (1946) and 173F. 2d 79 (1949).
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had shifted from attempts to curtail the growth of major 
concerns to efforts to aid smaller enterprises through 
educational, financial, and various other subsidies so that 
they could continue to co-exist with the giant corporations 
of the nation. The Senate Small Business Committee, through 
its hearings and investigations, illustrated this change.
This change in thinking about big business versus small
f
• ■
business was never spelled out by the Committee, yet it 
indicated the way in which the country had grown as a 
result of the wartime economy.
Many changes had taken place in American society 
by the end of the Second World War. No longer would issues 
be as easily classified as either black or white. Murray*s 
old-fashioned liberalism was as out of place in the post­
war environment as Wherry*s conservatism. Murray had failed 
to adequately adapt to changes in thinking which fore­
shadowed the "military-industrial complex" mentality of 
the 1950’s and 1960’s, while Wherry1s conservative fear of 
big government provided no viable alternative in the sophis­
ticated technological society which was emerging. Both 
men looked nostalgically to the less complicated past when 
it had seemed quite possible for an ambitious individual 
with courage and hard work to become an "Horatio Alger."
They both tried, in different ways, to keep this opportunity
120
alive. Yet, post-Depression and post-war Americans had 
become more interested in security and comfort; most saw 
the possibility of becoming independently wealthy as a 
mere dream.
Small businessmerf and the larger corporations were 
concerned with a rational, ordered economy so that all 
could share in the ffgood life.*1 Previous attempts at
5:
providing order had proved only partially successful, ^
perhaps because there had been no simple solutions to the 
complexities of an America in the twentieth century. The 
Senate Small Business Committee did nothing to clarify the 
problem. Xt had not even been able to give a truly con­
vincing argument for the continued existence of small 
business despite the gut-feelings they shared that somehow 
it was important and good. Just as the agrarian ideal had 
been pervasive throughout earlier periods of American 
history, the small business man symbolized the America of 
the early twentieth century. But Just as farmers had been 
relegated to a secondary position by increased industriali­
zation, so the small business man became less dominant in 
the emerging corporate state♦
As the formation of a Senate Small Business Committee 
reflected, small business had been put on the defensive.
The hearings and investigations conducted by the Committee
121
only reinforced this contention. Big business did not need 
to justify its place in defense production as small business 
did; big business could virtually take care of itself during 
reconversion, but smaller concerns needed help of all kinds.
That small business did survive the war and even prospered 
in the post-war environment cannot obscure the fact that 
the economy had made a momentous shift toward concentration,
sand most importantly, this concentration had become an 
accepted way of life to most Americans. Large concerns 
could provide more job security and greater fringe benefits 
than could most small businesses. The government might 
continue to encourage small concerns, but it would not be 
allowed to do so at the expense of their larger competitors. 
Small business might indeed be sacred as Senator Murray 
often insisted, but big business was profitable, and 
therefore, more valuable than any marginal small concern 
could ever be, no matter how holy.
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APPENDIX II 
1919
1
NUMBER OF FIRMS BY EMPLOYEE TOTALS IN MANUFACTURING
Total * 1-5 6-20 21-50 51-100
# of estab.
# of workers
# of estab.
290,105 141,742 56,208 25,379 12,405
9,096,372 311,576 631,290 829,301 888,344 
101-250 251-500 500-1000 Over 1000
10,068 3,599 1,749 1,021
# of whiskers 1,581,768 1,250,875 1,205,627 2,397,596
1
Abstract of the Fourteenth Census of the U.S., 
Department of Commerce (Washington: Government Printing 
Office), 1923, pp. 986-987.
1949
t
NUMBER OF FIRMS BY EMPLOYEE TOTALS IN MANUFACTURING
Total
240,881
14,294,304
100-499
19,878
4,160,981
1-9 10-49
80,662
50-99
18,672# of estab.
# of workers
# of estab.
# of workers
2
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States: 1949, seventieth edition (Washington: 
Government Printing Office), 1949, p. 929#
117,005
471,887 1,805,842 1,300,719
qOQ-QQO Over 1000
2,729 1,935
1,883,464 4,671,411
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